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Article 
Reclaiming International Law from 
Extraterritoriality 
Austen L. Parrish† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Over the past decade, international law scholars have en-
gaged in an ongoing intellectual skirmish. On one side are the 
Sovereigntists.1 Animated by legal and political realism, the 
Sovereigntists’ ranks are filled with scholars who are skeptical 
of—if not hostile to—international law and institutions.2 For 
Sovereigntists, sometimes referred to as nationalists or revi-
sionists,3 international law poses a threat to democratic sove-
 
†  Vice-Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Southwestern 
Law School. J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1997; B.A., University 
of Washington, 1994. The author is the Director of Southwestern’s Summer 
Law Program in Vancouver, B.C., Canada, where he teaches courses in inter-
national and comparative law at the University of British Columbia. The au-
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Silvia Faerman, Bryant Garth, Noah Hall, Sung Hui Kim, Ashley Parrish, Kal 
Raustiala, David Zaring, and Christopher Whytock for their helpful comments 
on earlier drafts, and to Christine Chung, Natasha Hill, and Sudhir Lay for 
their research assistance. The Article benefited from comments received at 
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national Law Weekend-West conference. The author presented this article at 
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Canadian Law and Society Association. Copyright © 2009 by Austen 
L. Parrish. 
 1. Peter Spiro is often attributed with coining the term Sovereigntist in a 
well-known Foreign Affairs article with the same title. Peter J. Spiro, The New 
Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, FOREIGN 
AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2000, at 9 [hereinafter Spiro, The New Sovereigntists]; see also 
Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 649, 653 n.16 (2002) [hereinafter Spiro, Globalization] (introducing 
the basic beliefs of Sovereigntists). 
 2. See Spiro, The New Sovereigntists, supra note 1, at 9. 
 3. Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revision-
ism in International Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1405 n.4 (2006) (reviewing 
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005)); see also JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE 7 (2005) (describ-
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reignty, and in turn to American culture and uniqueness.4 In 
many contexts, the Sovereigntists contend, international law 
amounts “to a mere set of rhetorical statements that are obeyed 
only when convenient to those holding the reins of coercive 
power.”5 International law must be narrowly cabined and 
downplayed to avoid undermining American interests. From 
the Sovereigntist perspective, those who uncritically embrace 
liberal internationalism are naïve. Scholars like Curtis Brad-
ley, Jack Goldsmith, Julian Ku, Eric Posner, Jeremy Rabkin, 
Jed Rubenfeld, and John Yoo are often identified with the So-
vereigntist movement.6 
 
ing the revisionist movement); Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the 
Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 341–42 
(2005) (arguing revisionism is a better characterization of this group of scho-
lars); Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in For-
eign Affairs: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 
855, 864–65 (2005) (identifying key characteristics of revisionist scholarship). 
 4. Daniel W. Drezner, On the Balance Between International Law and 
Democratic Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 321, 323–34 (2001) (describing con-
cern that international law is “making a sure and steady encroachment on 
democratic sovereignty, affecting the United States in particular”); see also 
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Fed-
eral Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 
873 (1997) (arguing that customary international law carries with it implica-
tions that are in tension with [America’s] constitutional principles); Jed Ru-
benfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1971, 2006 (2004) (“[I]nternational law today rests on a fundamentally anti-
democratic conception of fundamental law . . . .”). But see Anupam Chander, 
Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1196 (2005) (rebutting claims 
for the existence of a “democratic deficit at the international level”). For a re-
cent discussion of the perceived threat that international law poses to demo-
cratic sovereignty in the debate over the use of international (or foreign) law in 
constitutional decisions, see John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should Interna-
tional Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (2007); cf. Pa-
trick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. 
REV. 4, 37–38 (1995) (arguing against the use of foreign law by U.S. courts be-
cause of its perceived democratic deficiency). 
 5. Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globaliza-
tion, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 492–93 (2005) (citing GOLDSMITH & 
POSNER, supra note 3); see also Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New In-
ternational Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 463, 468 (2006) (“In-
ternational law is limited because it is a product of, and is bounded by, state 
interests and the distribution of power.”). 
 6. Kenneth Anderson, Remarks by an Idealist on the Realism of The Lim-
its of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 253, 262 (2006) (describing 
the “‘new sovereignty’ positions put forward by such writers as Jeremy Rab-
kin, Julian Ku, Jack Goldsmith, John Yoo, Curtis Bradley, and Jed Rubenfeld, 
among others”); John E. Noyes, Universalism and the American Tradition of 
International Law, 21 CONN. J. INT’L L. 199, 201–02 (2006) (describing the 
“modern ‘revisionist’ scholarship of Curtis Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, John Yoo, 
Michael Glennon, and others” who are “dismissive of international law, mini-
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On the other side are the modern Internationalists.7 These 
scholars reject the Sovereigntist thesis and instead herald in-
ternational law as the key means of promoting human and en-
vironmental rights, as well as global peace and stability. The 
modern Internationalists, however, approach these goals from 
a perspective different than their predecessors.8 They are mod-
ern in their orientation because they view international norms 
as appropriately created and enforced at the substate or trans-
national level.9 Buoyed by concepts of universal jurisdiction 
and loosened constraints on territoriality, the modern Interna-
tionalists find the traditional view of international lawmaking 
as the exclusive business of nation-states to be anachronistic. 
Rather, they embrace transnational processes, transgovern-
mental networks, and cheer that national governments are no 
longer the sole bearers of rights and duties in the international 
sphere.10 Consistent with this focus on substate and nonstate 
actors, the modern Internationalists have sought to deploy do-
mestic courts around the world to implement and enforce in-
ternational law.11 Yale’s Dean Harold Koh and Princeton’s 
Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter are among the most well known of 
these scholars, while many other well-regarded academics em-
 
mizing its significance or denying altogether its reality”); Spiro, The New So-
vereigntists, supra note 1, at 9–10, 13 (identifying Curtis Bradley, Jack 
Goldsmith, Jeremy Rabkin, and John Yoo as Sovereigntist scholars). 
 7. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, 
Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 
1564, 1569 (2006) (describing a group of international law scholars who “wel-
come learning from abroad”). 
 8. See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. Scholars like Louis 
Henkin, Philip C. Jessup, and Oscar Schachter are often associated with the 
traditional Internationalist position. See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BE-
HAVE 1–8 (2d ed. 1979); PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 1–15 
(1948); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 1–
16 (1991). 
 9. See infra Section I.B. 
 10. Yishai Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 263, 265 (2006); see also Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Glo-
balization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 169–76 (1999). 
 11. See, e.g., William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scho-
larship: The Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of 
Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 129–35 (2000); Leah 
Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 
YALE L.J. 2277, 2281–91 (1991); Harold Hongju Koh, Civil Remedies for Unci-
vil Wrongs: Combating Terrorism Through Transnational Public Law Litiga-
tion, 22 TEX. INT’L L.J. 169, 193–201 (1987) [hereinafter Koh, Civil Remedies 
for Uncivil Wrongs]; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litiga-
tion, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2350–75 (1991) [hereinafter Koh, Transnational 
Public Law Litigation].  
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brace, to differing degrees, the modern Internationalist pers-
pective.12 
Although it has played out in the halls of academia and in 
the pages of prominent law journals, the clash between these 
two perspectives is hardly academic. Much is at stake. Under-
standing how these perspectives differ affects the way academ-
ics, lawyers, and policymakers think about international law, 
the relationship between international and domestic courts, 
and the value of multilateral, international treaties.13 More 
palpably, the Sovereigntist-versus-Internationalist debate has 
paved the way for changes occurring in international law and 
relations. In the last two decades, the United States has disen-
gaged from the traditional sources of international law, declin-
ing to enter into multilateral conventions or undertake new in-
ternational legal obligations.14 Concomitant with this retreat—
filling the void left by U.S. disengagement—the number of U.S. 
lawsuits where American laws are applied extraterritorially15 
to solve global problems has grown. This trend, however, is not 
peculiar to the United States. Increasingly other countries are 
also applying their laws extraterritorially to exert international 
influence and solve transboundary challenges.16 Whether 
spurred by globalization, the end of the Cold War, or other 
causes, the traditional sources of international law are neg-
lected now more than ever.17 
 
 12. For some of the leading scholarship, see infra notes 62–82. 
 13. See OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 3 (2005) (describing the importance of ap-
preciating the different theoretical perspectives animating international law 
scholarship); see also Stephen M. Walt, International Relations: One World, 
Many Theories, FOREIGN POL’Y, Spring 1998, at 29, 29 (“We need theories to 
make sense of the blizzard of information that bombards us daily. Even poli-
cymakers who are contemptuous of ‘theory’ must rely on their own (often un-
stated) ideas about how the world works in order to decide what to do.”). 
 14. See infra Section II.A. 
 15. Extraterritoriality is defined in myriad ways. Broadly, “a case involves 
extraterritoriality when at least one relevant event occurs in another nation.” 
Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth 
Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1218 n.3 (1992). For pur-
poses of this Article, extraterritoriality exists when a court applies domestic 
laws to foreigners for conduct occurring beyond the country’s borders. The 
extraterritorial application of law is also sometimes referred to as the exercise 
of “prescriptive” or “legislative” jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 (1987). This Article does not address the extraterri-
torial regulation of a country’s own citizens. 
 16. See infra notes 191–206 and accompanying text. 
 17. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 
38(1), 59 Stat. 1031, 1060 (listing the traditional sources of international law, 
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Although academics have written extensively about other 
changes to the international system—the influence of interna-
tional organizations, the proliferation of independent interna-
tional tribunals, and the role of substate and local govern-
ments, to name a few—the rise of global extraterritoriality as 
an alternative to international lawmaking has received less at-
tention.18 Sovereigntists support the spreading disengagement 
with international law, satisfied if politics and power drive in-
ternational policy.19 Aside from the human rights literature, 
where a heated debate ensues,20 the Sovereigntists appear not 
especially alarmed over the growth of extraterritoriality, believ-
ing it to be largely an American phenomenon. The modern In-
ternationalists also seem undisturbed. Without considering im-
portant distinctions between extraterritorial domestic laws and 
the integration of international law,21 Internationalists are en-
couraged if progress occurs on the domestic front where inter-
 
including international conventions). 
 18. A vast literature concerns the effects of international law on domestic 
governance, and a burgeoning amount of scholarship addresses the integration 
of international law into domestic regimes. Markedly less attention, howev-
er—particularly outside the conflicts of law literature—has been given to the 
interaction of domestic extraterritorial law and international law. For some 
exceptions, see Tonya L. Putnam, Courts Without Borders: The Domestic 
Sources of U.S. Extraterritorial Regulation (forthcoming) (manuscript on file 
with author); Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Gover-
nance (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author). 
 19. For a recent example, see Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, International 
Law and the Rise of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 15 (2006) (rejecting the view 
that the United States should support international institutions in containing 
Chinese hegemony and advocating for the United States to “strengthen[] its 
military, economic, and political relationships”). 
 20. Sovereigntists have criticized human rights litigation in U.S. courts. 
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litiga-
tion, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 458 (2001); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 319, 320 (1997); see also David J. Bederman, International Law 
Advocacy and Its Discontents, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 476 (2001) (discussing 
scholarship which considers various implications of international human 
rights litigation in the United States); cf. Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Cus-
tomary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 869, 870 (2007) (arguing that customary international law is not self-
executing as federal common law and discussing the use of customary interna-
tional law in Alien Tort Statute litigation). 
 21. For recent articles discussing the integration of international law into 
domestic regimes, see Margaret E. McGuinness, Sanchez-Llamas, American 
Human Rights Exceptionalism and the VCCR Norm Portal, 11 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 47, 48, 51–52 (2007); Resnik, supra note 7, at 1567–70; Melissa A. Wa-
ters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation 
of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 652–94 (2007). 
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national norms can be internalized.22 In general, academics 
have accepted the growth of extraterritoriality as an inevita-
ble—and either a desirable or innocuous—byproduct of globali-
zation. 
The acceptance is unfortunate: this Article argues that 
both the Sovereigntists and the modern Internationalists unde-
restimate the problems that extraterritoriality engenders. The 
conventional wisdom from both groups, given the global rise of 
extraterritoriality, is unlikely to advance the goals that each 
seeks. On the one hand, in a modern integrated, globalized 
world, those concerned with safeguarding democratic sove-
reignty should turn toward, not away from, international law. 
The rise of extraterritorial domestic law (law unilaterally ap-
plied to the conduct of foreigners abroad) poses a greater threat 
to democratic sovereignty than traditional sources of interna-
tional law. Also, the use of international treaties combined with 
robust international institutions may be one of the best ways to 
reclaim sovereign integrity. On the other hand, the extraterri-
torial application of domestic laws in transnational litigation 
threatens concepts of human dignity, human rights, and envi-
ronmental rights in the long term more than the modern Inter-
nationalists realize. Contrary to prevailing wisdom, the disas-
sembling of the nation-state and the declining salience of 
territorial borders—to the extent it manifests itself in extrater-
ritorial domestic actions—is a troubling, not a positive, devel-
opment. Broadly speaking, human rights and environmental 
rights are better protected when international problems are 
solved internationally, not unilaterally (or even surreptitiously) 
through domestic litigation. 
This Article offers a way beyond the stalemate that the So-
vereigntist and modern Internationalist perspectives have pro-
duced. In so doing, it advocates an approach different from the 
dominant views prevailing in international law scholarship; an 
approach that acknowledges changes in the international sys-
tem, but also seeks to shore up territorial sovereignty to pre-
vent the problems that extraterritoriality creates. Multilateral 
treaty-making processes should be reinvigorated and tradition-
al international lawmaking embraced, while domestic litigation 
 
 22. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing In-
ternational Law Home (Apr. 8, 1998), in 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 626–27 (1998) 
(describing how “vertical domestication” occurs through transnational law, 
“whereby international law norms ‘trickle down’ and become incorporated into 
domestic legal systems”). 
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should be used more cautiously in response to international 
challenges.23 In short, recent international law scholarship has 
too often celebrated the demise of territoriality without appre-
ciating the risks that extraterritorial approaches to interna-
tional challenges pose. In staking this position, the Article 
avoids concluding whether the Sovereigntists’ or the modern 
Internationalists’ view of the world is normatively preferred. 
Rather it seeks to reveal problems with extraterritoriality for 
both schools of thought. The Article also does not challenge the 
empirical observation that local actors are playing a more 
prominent role in international relations, or that in many ways 
this is a good thing. Nevertheless, downplaying the role that 
states and traditional international law should play in address-
ing international challenges is a mistake. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, the Article 
explores the two dominant, broadly defined perspectives in cur-
rent international law scholarship—Sovereigntism and modern 
Internationalism. In Part II, the Article describes how the posi-
tions staked by scholars with these differing perspectives have 
encouraged changes in the international legal system: the U.S. 
disengagement with multilateral treaties, and the replacement 
of international with domestic law. Lastly, in Part III, the Ar-
ticle describes why extraterritoriality is a development to be 
concerned with, not applauded. Taking the concerns of both the 
Sovereigntists and the modern Internationalists seriously, 
extraterritoriality poses a greater threat to what both groups 
value most than does traditional international law. The Article 
closes by exploring the implications of this critique, and by 
promoting a cautious return to a more traditional approach to 
international lawmaking. 
I.  SETTING THE INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT   
No single label applies for the different theories at play in 
international law scholarship; although many schools of 
thought, ranging from realism, to liberalism, to institutional-
ism, to constructivism, among others, exist.24 Yet in very broad 
 
 23. Cf. Alfred P. Rubin, Can the United States Police the World?, 13 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 371, 374 (1989) (“Our actions would be more effec-
tive if aimed at achieving international cooperation in ways consistent with 
the international legal order instead of simply asserting wider American pre-
scriptive, adjudicatory, and enforcement jurisdiction.”). 
 24. See Walt, supra note 13, at 30–42 (providing an overview of realism, 
institutionalism, and constructivism); see also Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern In-
ternational Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE 
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terms, much recent international law scholarship can be cha-
racterized as falling into one of two categories: that which is 
skeptical of international law (i.e., Sovereigntist scholarship) 
and that which more readily embraces and encourages interna-
tional law and institutions (i.e., Internationalist scholarship).25 
A. THE SOVEREIGNTISTS 
Drawing from realist origins,26 Sovereigntists emphasize 
the role of power and state interests in international law and 
relations.27 Grounded in a “general skepticism of international 
 
J. INT’L L. 335, 336–41 (1989) (introducing major theoretical paradigms in in-
ternational relations theory); Peter J. Kaztenstein et al., International Organ-
ization and the Study of World Politics, 52 INT’L ORG. 645, 646–50 (1998) (de-
scribing realism, neoliberal institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism); 
Susan Peterson et al., Inside the Ivory Tower, FOREIGN POL’Y, Nov.–Dec. 2005, 
at 58, 61 (discussing trends in international relations theory). For a thorough 
description of these schools of thought in the context of debates over interna-
tional organizations, see JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS 
LAW-MAKERS 17–45 (2005). 
 25. C ategorizing international scholars as either Sovereigntists or Inter-
nationalists is well accepted. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Globalization, In-
ternational Law and United States Foreign Policy, 50 EMORY L.J. 717, 721, 
732–35 (2001) (reflecting on differences between Sovereigntists and Interna-
tionalists); Margaret E. McGuinness, Contesting the “Sovereigntists”: How to 
Learn to Stop Worrying and Love International Institutions, 38 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 831, 831 (2006) (reviewing DAN SAROOSHI, INTERNATIONAL OR-
GANIZATIONS AND THEIR EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS (2005)) (describing 
Sovereigntist and Internationalist positions); Resnik, supra note 7, at 1569 
(“The Sovereigntist model has a competitor: internationalism.”); David Sloss, 
Using International Law to Enhance Democracy, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 48–49 
(2006) (explaining Sovereigntist and Internationalist positions regarding the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Other terms are also 
used to describe these two broadly defined divisions in international law scho-
larship. See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Serious-
ly?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 205, 206 (2000) (“In substantive field after field—human 
rights, labor, health, the environment, political-military affairs, and interna-
tional organizations—the Globalists have been advancing while the Ameri-
canists have slept.”); Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1789, 1791 (2003) (describing the difference between realists 
and liberal internationalists); Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Prin-
ciple: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 476–
77 (2005) (detailing the difference between interest-based and norm-based ap-
proaches to international law).  
 26. Greenberg, supra note 25, at 1804–05 (describing realism in interna-
tional relations theory); Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power 
and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 64, 71–76 (2006) (describing differ-
ent approaches to realism and asserting that Sovereigntists draw from con-
cepts of structural realism). For the classic realist account, see HANS MORE-
GENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 
4–17 (6th ed. 1985). 
 27. For some examples of this theory, see GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra 
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law and institutions,”28 and a concern that America is “out-
sourcing” its sovereignty to international institutions,29 Sove-
reigntists generally embrace the realist conclusion that “inter-
national law essentially does not matter (or does not matter 
very much).”30 At times, American exceptionalism31—the idea 
that the United States is different from the rest of the world, 
and unbound by the rules it promotes32—is the basis for the 
conclusion. At other times, the conclusion is animated by a con-
cern that other countries use international law selectively and 
strategically to advance their interests on the global stage, at 
American expense.33 In some ways, the Sovereigntist position 
has developed as a backlash against neoliberal globalization 
and in favor of national control. As a result, scholars sometimes 
describe the Sovereigntist movement as nationalist or revision-
ist.34 
Sovereigntists, although cynical of many forms of interna-
tional law, particularly distrust multilateral treaties and the 
supranational institutions they create.35 Treaties are viewed as 
subservient to state power and therefore weak and unreliable.36 
 
note 3, at 3 (describing a modern rational choice theory of international law); 
KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979) (describing the 
classic account of neorealism or structural realism).  
 28. Spiro, Globalization, supra note 1, at 654 n.16; see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
5 (2005) (“Our strength as a nation will continue to be challenged by those who 
employ a strategy of the weak, focusing on international fora, judicial 
processes, and terrorism.” (emphasis added)). 
 29. McGuinness, supra note 25, at 831; see, e.g., Robert Bork, The Limits 
of International “Law,” NAT’L INT., Winter 1989–1990, at 1, 1–10 (criticizing 
international law and arguing that reliance on it is often against U.S. inter-
ests); Charles Krauthammer, The Curse of Legalism, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 
1989, at 44 (arguing against the use of international law). 
 30. Greenberg, supra note 25, at 1791. 
 31. For a description of different kinds of American exceptionalism, see 
Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 
1480–87 (2003); see also McGuinness, supra note 21, at 48, 51–52 (describing 
American exceptionalism in the human rights context). 
 32. See James C. Hathaway, America, Defender of Democratic Legitimacy, 
11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 121 (2000). 
 33. For a brief discussion of strategic American and European uses of in-
ternational law, see Drezner, supra note 4, at 329–32. 
 34. See sources cited supra note 3. 
 35. Opposition to the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court 
is commonly cited as an example of this cynicism. See Mariano-Florentino 
Cuéllar, The International Criminal Court and the Political Economy of Anti-
treaty Discourse, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1601–06 (2003). 
 36. Greenberg, supra note 25, at 1796 (citing EDWARD HALLETT CARR, 
THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS 1919–1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
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Sovereigntists also condemn treaties for reaching “deeply into 
the internal affairs of sovereign nations,” threatening “internal 
systems of government.”37 At minimum, international commit-
ments have a “tendency . . . to shift powers and responsibilities 
from national and sub-national units, with active, reachable 
legislative bodies to remote international bureaucracies.”38 So-
vereigntists believe that treaties should have very limited do-
mestic effect.39 Additionally, Sovereigntists often criticize clas-
sic liberal Internationalists, who value international treaties 
and global governance, as naïvely idealist.40 
At the heart of the Sovereigntists’ perspective lies the 
question of democratic legitimacy.41 Sovereigntists worry that 
“international law takes policymaking power out of the hands 
of those [the Sovereigntists] think should have it (the political 
branches and state governments, chief among them) and gives 
it to those who should not (international institutions and un-
elected federal judges) . . . .”42 As a result, the “extreme end of 
 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 181–87 (2d ed. 1946)); see also GOLDSMITH & 
POSNER, supra note 3, at 87 (noting skepticism that “genuine multinational 
collective action problems can be solved by treaty”). 
 37. American Land Sovereignty Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 883 Be-
fore the H. Comm. On Resources, 106th Cong. 102 (1999) (statement of Jeremy 
Rabkin); cf. John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?, 10 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 26–27 (2000) (arguing that treaties are 
not legally binding). 
 38. Detlev F. Vagts, International Agreements, the Senate and the Consti-
tution, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 143, 154 (1997). 
 39. See Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Con-
stitution, and Non-Self Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1595–96 (2003) 
(supporting the non-self-execution of treaties as a matter of constitutional con-
cern); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and 
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 456–68 (2000) (maintaining that 
the Senate may impose unilateral conditions limiting or nullifying treaty obli-
gations); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-
Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2091 
(1999) (arguing almost all treaties are non-self-executing); John C. Yoo, Trea-
ties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-
Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2219 (1999) (contending the text and 
structure of the Constitution support a presumption that treaties are not self-
executing).  
 40. See Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention, Banning Landmines, 
the Role of International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of In-
ternational Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 91, 97 (2000) (criticizing “the 
myopia of wishful and self-righteous internationalist thinking”); Stephen D. 
Krasner, Realist Views of International Law, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 
268 (2002) (“It is naïve to expect that a stable international order can be 
erected on normative principles embodied in international law.”). 
 41. See sources cited supra note 4. 
 42. Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 3, at 1406–07; see also Paul B. 
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the sovereigntist side of the debate has been marked by nativist 
fears of erosion of American social and political fabric, and, 
notably, by the belief that participation in international insti-
tutions and judicial processes actually weakens national securi-
ty.”43 
At the very least, scholars skeptical of international law 
and its institutions often refer to the threat it poses to sove-
reignty, its lack of accountability, and to the notion of a 
“mounting ‘democratic deficit’ in global governance.”44 Plenty of 
scholarship questions whether international law and institu-
tions are consistent with the U.S. constitution and principles of 
democratic sovereignty.45 
 
Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 237, 238 (2000) (arguing that international law is steadily encroaching upon 
democratic sovereignty). 
 43. McGuinness, supra note 25, at 832; cf. JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITH-
OUT NATIONS? 45–70 (2005) (explaining the importance of American sove-
reignty); Ken I. Kersch, The New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Ju-
diciary, and the Rule of Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345, 346 
(2005) (“[Transnationalism] is part of an elite-driven, politically motivated 
worldwide trend toward judicial governance, which is antithetical to democrat-
ic self-rule, if not to the rule of law itself . ”). 
 44. Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International 
Economic Law, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 841, 844 (2003); see Resnik, supra note 7, at 
1574 (“American sovereigntists insist on a competing ethical obligation—to 
majoritarian decisionmaking.”); see also sources cited supra note 4. For partic-
ularly bleak outlooks on the threat international law poses to democracy, see 
Bob Barr, Protecting National Sovereignty in an Era of International Med-
dling: An Increasingly Difficult Task, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 299 (2002) (ar-
guing that international law and particularly international organizations are 
a threat to U.S. democratic sovereignty); Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Or-
ders, WILSON Q., Autumn 2003, at 22, 34 (“International law is a threat to 
democracy and to the hopes of democratic politics all over the world.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 39, at 1560 (analyzing whether treaty 
delegations to international bodies are constitutional); Michael J. Glennon & 
Allison R. Hayward, Collective Security and the Constitution: Can the Com-
mander in Chief Power Be Delegated to the United Nations?, 82 GEO. L.J. 
1573, 1587 (1994) (analyzing whether the President may constitutionally place 
U.S. troops under UN command); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal 
Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 71, 76 (2000) (exploring whether treaty-based international del-
egations are constitutional); John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multi-
lateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1713 (2000) (discussing constitutional 
limitations on the President’s authority to place U.S. troops under foreign 
command); John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The 
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST. 
COMMENT. 87, 116 (1998) (exploring the constitutionality of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, given its creation of an international organization with 
authority to search U.S. territory). 
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Notably, Sovereigntists traditionally focus almost exclu-
sively on state-level interactions, and deemphasize substate 
dynamics.46 To some extent, this is natural. The theories that 
commonly animate the Sovereigntist perspective (realism and 
rationalism) usually view states as rational actors in pursuit of 
self-interest.47 To the extent that Sovereigntists have focused 
on the extraterritorial application of domestic law then, they 
have mostly limited their critiques to public international law 
litigation.48 And in that context, the general approach is to cri-
ticize extraterritorial human rights litigation, without provid-
ing an alternative remedy for victims of abuse. Sovereigntists 
do not encourage the strengthening of international human 
rights regimes. Nor do they urge that the United States sign on 
to additional human rights treaties. 
Often Sovereigntists are perceived as allied with the politi-
cal right. But that oversimplifies. The Sovereigntist perspective 
has broader appeal: “Many consumer advocates, environmen-
talists, and antiglobalization activists decry the ‘faceless bu-
reaucrats’” of some international organizations, “whom they see 
as undermining American democracy, sovereignty, and regula-
tory autonomy.”49 Even liberals have advocated for ignoring 
multilateral institutions and international law if the goals are 
important enough.50 Indeed, “reservations regarding interna-
 
 46. Hathaway, supra note 25, at 479. 
 47. Id. at 478. 
 48. See supra note 20. 
 49. Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globa-
lizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1494 (2006) (citing LORI WAL-
LACH & MICHELLE SFORZA, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION? CORPORATE GLO-
BALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY (1999)); see also DANIEL C. 
ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 35 
(1994) (describing environmentalists’ hostility to the World Trade Organiza-
tion); José E. Alvarez, Multilateralism and Its Discontents, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
393, 396–97 (2000) (noting that “multilateralism’s critics are not merely hard-
headed political realists” but include both ends of the political spectrum and a 
wide number of scholars emerging with the international academy including 
critical legal scholars, feminists, constructivists, liberal theorists, public choice 
theorists and those within law and economics). 
 50. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transforma-
tions of the World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian 
Intervention, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 3, 17 (2000) (supporting unilateralism in the 
context of humanitarian intervention, even when the action is contrary to the 
UN Charter or more traditional sources of international law). Often opposition 
is to free trade agreements like NAFTA. The demonstrations in Seattle in the 
mid-1990s against the WTO provide another example. 
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tional law are now shared across the political spectrum and are 
embraced by conservative and liberal commentators alike.”51 
B. THE MODERN INTERNATIONALISTS 
The modern Internationalists have a different perspective 
from both the Sovereigntists and their liberal international law 
predecessors. Historically, international law was state-centric, 
positivistic, and focused on territorial boundaries.52 According-
ly, international law scholars “traditionally located interna-
tional law in the acts of official governmental bureaucratic enti-
ties, such as the treaties and agreements entered into by 
nation-states, the declarations and protocols of the United Na-
tions (UN) or other affiliated bodies, and the rulings of interna-
tional courts and tribunals.”53 Classic liberal internationalists 
argued that multilateral treaties were the primary source of 
law that would constrain and influence state behavior and 
transform the international system.54 They sought to use multi-
lateral treaties and international institutions as a way to pro-
mote human and environmental rights, and to secure global 
peace and stability. “Although some liberals flirted with the 
idea that new transnational actors . . . were gradually en-
croaching on the power of states, liberalism generally saw 
states as the central players in international affairs.”55 From 
the 1960s through the end of the Cold War, this focus on state 
 
 51. Jutta Brunnée, The United States and International Environmental 
Law: Living with an Elephant, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 617, 642 (2004). 
 52. For a general description of the territorial state and classic interna-
tional law, see Austen L. Parrish, Changing Territoriality, Fading Sovereignty, 
and the Development of Indigenous Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 291, 293–97 
(2007). See also Stuart Elden, Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and 
the Sanctity of Borders, 26 SAIS REV. 11, 11 (2006) (“Since the end of World 
War II, the international political system has been structured around three 
central tenets: the notion of equal sovereignty of states, internal competence 
for domestic jurisdiction, and territorial preservation of existing boundaries.”); 
Michael M’Gonigle, Between Globalism and Territoriality: The Emergence of 
an International Constitution and the Challenge of Ecological Legitimacy, 15 
CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 159, 168 (2002) (referring to “[t]he political 
legitimacy and exclusivity accorded to the organized sovereign state as the 
sole subject of international law”). 
 53. Berman, supra note 5, at 492. 
 54. Greenberg, supra note 25, at 1791. For examples of the classic liberal 
internationalist view of international law, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995), and HENKIN, supra note 8. 
 55. Walt, supra note 13, at 32. 
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action—and the treaties signed and ratified by nation-states—
dominated international law scholarship.56 
In recent years, however, the salience of the sovereign 
state as the only subject of international law has declined.57 
Contrary to the classic positivist view of international law, 
“[s]tates are no longer the sole bearers of rights and duties in 
the international sphere, nor are they the sole actors in the in-
ternational arena.”58 Nonstate actors are important.59 Indeed, 
domestic interest groups, nongovernmental organizations, mul-
tinational corporations, and many other groups play an impor-
tant role in the globalized world.60 Or, put differently, “[a]s so-
vereignty has declined in importance, global decision-making 
functions are now executed by a complex rugby scrum of na-
tion-states, intergovernmental organizations, regional com-
pacts, nongovernmental organizations, and informal regimes 
and networks.”61 
 
 56. See David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the 
Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 335, 341–42 (2000) (describing a post-1960 
resurgence of “updated, pragmatic, and liberal internationalism” lasting to the 
end of the Cold War); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey In-
ternational Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2630 (1997) (describing changes occur-
ring after the end of the Cold War). 
 57. For well-known discussions of the changing role of state sovereignty, 
see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); STE-
PHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999); SASKIA SAS-
SEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996). 
 58. Yishai Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 263, 265 (2006); see also Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Glo-
balization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 169 (1999) (arguing that states are not “mo-
nolithic entities” and that competing domestic interest groups play a crucial 
role). 
 59. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 5–6 (2004); see 
also Philippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of Interna-
tional Law, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 527, 529–30 (2001) (describing the 
classic system where the “state was the only player, and the need to protect its 
sovereignty was paramount,” and discussing the recent changes to this model, 
including the rise of nonstate actors); Peter J. Spiro, Nonstate Actors in Global 
Politics, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 808 (1998) (reviewing literature describing the rise 
of nonstate actors in international law); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New 
World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 183, 184–86 (explaining that 
the state is disaggregating and noting the gain in power of nonstate actors). 
 60. Blank, supra note 58, at 265; see also José E. Alvarez, The New Treaty 
Makers, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 213, 218–32 (2002) (discussing the role 
of international organizations); Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, Internation-
al Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1946 (1997) (describing the increased role of private per-
sonae, multinational corporations, and international institutions). 
 61. Koh, supra note 56, at 2631. 
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Dramatic as these changes have been, equally dramatic 
have been the changes in international law scholarship. In the 
past decade, a new surge of international law scholarship at-
tempted to inject a different approach to understanding how 
and why states comply with international law.62 Drawing from 
constructivist schools of international relations scholarship,63 it 
became a common strand in this new scholarship that the na-
tion-state is no longer—and should not be—the only relevant 
actor in creating international law.64 This scholarship was new 
in its approach because although still internationally focused, it 
urged nonstate actors to create and enforce, more than ever be-
fore, international norms at the substate level.65 In part, NGOs 
closely allied themselves with and promoted this scholarship as 
they sought to secure their positions and authority as key play-
ers in the emerging field of international human rights.66 The 
modern Internationalists thus challenged the traditional statist 
foundations of liberal internationalism, which their predeces-
 
 62. Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Or-
der, 81 WASH. L. REV. 1, 37 (2006) (discussing “a new wave of international 
law scholarship” focused on “disaggregating the state into its constituent ele-
ments”); see generally JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 25–33, 201–02, 
959–61 (2d ed. 2006) (describing changes in international law theory). 
 63. Ku, supra note 62, at 37; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Inter-
national Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 205, 226–38 (1993) (discussing influences of constructivism on liberal 
internationalism). 
 64. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Chal-
lenge of Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17, 22–25 (1999) (discussing the 
important role of multinational corporations in protecting human rights); Os-
car Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for Interna-
tional Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 7, 21–22 (1997). 
 65. Liberal internationalists have long separated the individual from the 
state, and believe that nonstate actors compete with nation-states in the in-
ternational arena. See J. MARTIN ROCHESTER, BETWEEN PERIL AND PROMISE: 
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21–23 (2006). But traditional scholar-
ship has squarely located advances in the international legal system in the 
promulgation of treaties and international institutions. See supra notes 52–56 
and accompanying text. 
 66. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
PALACE WARS 10, 181–84 (2002) (describing the influence of NGOs); Yves De-
zalay & Bryant Garth, From the Cold War to Kosovo: The Rise and Renewal of 
the Field of International Human Rights, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 231, 231–
32 (2006) (describing the influence of three major human rights nongovern-
mental organizations in the period after World War II); see also DUNOFF ET 
AL., supra note 62, at 201–16 (describing the increased influence of NGOs on 
international lawmaking). 
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sors embraced.67 Often referred to as disaggregationist or 
transnationalist, scholars like Harold Koh68 and Anne-Marie 
Slaughter69—although taking different theoretical perspec-
tives—were at the forefront of this new internationalist move-
ment. 
A related phenomenon, however, also occurred. As realist, 
state-centric visions of international law came to be seen as 
overly simplistic, the modern Internationalists also sought to 
overcome that aspect of the classic model that treated interna-
tional litigation as separate from domestic litigation.70 Just as 
nontraditional actors were assuming important roles in inter-
national law, so too—thought the modern Internationalists—
should private plaintiffs and domestic courts.71 The modern In-
ternationalists accordingly not only support judges in different 
countries interacting and exchanging views on the meaning of 
law72—itself controversial73—but also encourage domestic 
 
 67. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: 
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2002) (describing challenges to the traditional liberal interna-
tionalist view). 
 68. See Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law En-
forced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999); Koh, supra note 22, at 623. 
 69. In international law scholarship, Anne-Marie Slaughter may be the 
most prominent advocate of the liberal institutionalist perspective. See Lau-
rence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supra-
national Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, In-
ternational Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503 (1995); 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations 
Theory and the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 377 (1994); Slaughter Burley, supra note 63, at 205. 
 70. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of Interna-
tional Law Is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 
327, 327–29 (2006) (describing the classic system of international law). 
 71. See Waters, supra note 21, at 652–94 (describing methods by which 
domestic courts incorporate international human rights laws); see also The 
Challenge of Bangalore: Making Human Rights a Practical Reality, in 8 DE-
VELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 267, 268 (Commonwealth Secreta-
riat ed., 2001) (describing how human rights transcend national political sys-
tems and how domestic courts must protect those rights). 
 72. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 191, 217 (2003) (“Judges from different legal systems should ex-
pressly acknowledge the possibility of learning from one another based on rel-
ative experience with a particular set of issues and on the quality of reasoning 
in specific decisions.”); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 1103, 1124 (2000) (stating that judges should “see one another not 
only as servants or even representatives of a particular government or polity, 
but as fellow professionals in a profession that transcends national borders”). 
 73. For a summary of the debates on whether the U.S. Supreme Court 
should look to foreign law, see Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. 
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courts to apply international and domestic laws to remedy in-
ternational harms.74 Scholars and activists began to view do-
mestic litigation as an important step in a move toward the ef-
fective enforcement of international norms.75 
The appeal of using domestic courts and domestic laws to 
solve transboundary challenges is understandable. Interna-
tional law based on a state-centric view of international rela-
tions has always had an uneasy relationship with the modern 
Internationalists’ ideals. Only recently has a state’s treatment 
of its own citizens become a matter of international rather than 
merely domestic concern.76 For instance, it was not until after 
the Second World War77 that human rights law developed into 
a meaningful, independent constraint on state action and a 
means to temper unlimited state power.78 More importantly, 
 
Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637, 649–52. 
 74. For some well-known examples, see Brilmayer, supra note 11, at 2277 
(describing various uses of international law in American courts, including in 
the context of extraterritorial jurisdiction); Koh, Transnational Public Law 
Litigation, supra note 11, at 2347 (advocating and encouraging transnational 
public law litigation). 
 75. See Koh, supra note 56, at 2602 (arguing for a transnational legal 
process); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff ’s Diplomacy, FOR-
EIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 102, 115 (embracing a “transnational legal sys-
tem capable of enforcing international law,” while criticizing “unilateral legal 
expansion”). Dean Koh has written extensively on the subject of transnational 
public law litigation. See Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs, supra note 
11, at 169; Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, supra note 11, at 2347. 
Dean Koh’s work builds, in part, on the public law litigation work by Abram 
Chayes in the 1970s. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). 
 76. Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model 
for International Environmental Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 71, 83 (2005) 
(discussing international human rights law); see also Winston P. Nagan & 
Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law 
and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 141, 177 (2004) 
(stating that if sovereigns “abuse their rights and disparage their obligations, 
they could be accused of being delinquent in international law”). 
 77. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 33–34 (1995) (noting the shift at midcentury from state 
values to human values in international law); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins 
of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L 
ORG. 217, 217–20 (2000) (considering the reasons for the construction of hu-
man rights regimes after the Second World War). 
 78. See Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 70, at 327 (noting how 
“growing bodies of human rights law and international criminal law” have 
“penetrated the once exclusive zone of domestic affairs”); see also Anne-Marie 
Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment, 
43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 21 (2002) (“[C]ivilian inviolability has been transformed 
from a rhetorical aside to a basic principle in many areas of international 
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international law has lacked effective enforcement mechan-
isms.79 No international tribunal exists exclusively to adjudi-
cate and resolve complaints when international law violations 
occur.80 And even if an international tribunal could adjudicate 
a particular dispute, it would lack coercive mechanisms to com-
pel even appearance, let alone compliance.81 Human rights and 
environmental rights advocates also felt at home in domestic 
courts, and through these actions sought to expand their influ-
ence.82 In this context, the scholarly turn to the domestic seems 
almost inevitable. 
II.  EMERGING TRENDS: REPLACING INTERNATIONAL 
LAW WITH DOMESTIC (TRANSNATIONAL) LAW   
The intellectual debate sketched above has had an im-
pact.83 It has created a fertile environment where traditional 
 
law.”). 
 79. Hathaway, supra note 25, at 489–91 (describing how international law 
often lacks enforcement and contrasting enforcement in domestic lawsuits). 
 80. Bradley, supra note 20, at 458. Both the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) are, of course, international 
courts, but they possess limited jurisdiction, and relatively few international 
issues are resolved in either forum. See Statute of the International Court of 
Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (providing that the ICJ 
hears disputes only between states who have accepted the court’s jurisdiction); 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 12–13, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 99 (authorizing the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over nation-
als of a nonstate party if (1) a national of an accepting nonstate party commits 
a crime within the territory of a state party, or (2) a national of a nonstate 
party commits a crime referred to the ICC by the Security Council). 
 81. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 69, at 285. 
 82. See Peer Zumbansen, Beyond Territoriality: The Case of Transnation-
al Human Rights Litigation (CONWEB Paper No.4/2005), http://www.bath.ac 
.uk/esml/conWEB/Conweb%20papers-filestore/conweb4-2005.pdf (outlining the 
use of civil litigation to redress alleged human rights abuse by public and pri-
vate actors); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter & David L. Bosco, Alternative Jus-
tice, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, May 2001, http://crimesofwar.org/tribun-
mag/mag_relate_alternative.html (noting the trend for victims of human 
rights abuses to seek relief in courts). 
 83. For recent articles that describe how conceptions of international law 
have influenced policy on the ground, see David J. Bederman, Appraising a 
Century of Scholarship in the American Journal of International Law, 100 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 20, 57–62 (2006) (discussing the impact of the American Journal of 
International Law on the field of international law in the last century); Tho-
mas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: Inter-
national Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 88 (2006) 
(analyzing the current debate over the role of international law in domestic 
affairs and the resulting policy impacts); Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 26, at 
86 (reviewing academic theories of international law and concluding that 
“each of the main orientations . . . now has a substantial—or dominant—camp 
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sources of international law—those created by nation-states—
are seen as problematic or, at least, unfashionable. The United 
States has shifted its international lawmaking efforts else-
where, and American plaintiffs perceive domestic litigation as 
one of the more promising means of resolving international 
disputes and promoting human rights.84 Legal consciousness 
has changed over time so that nonstate actors, policymakers, 
and attorneys turn first and instinctively to extraterritorial 
domestic remedies, rather than international ones, when faced 
with an international challenge. 
A. THE DISENGAGEMENT FROM INTERNATIONAL TREATY LAW 
In the years immediately following World War II, interna-
tional law flourished. For its part, the United States was a 
leader in promoting the development of international institu-
tions as a way of peacefully resolving disputes between na-
tions.85 It was the driving force behind the creation of the Unit-
ed Nations,86 and Americans were “among the primary 
architects of the initial human rights conventions and the 
strongest champions of international institutions to monitor 
rights violations and to govern the use of military force.”87 In 
 
that uses a combination of heuristics to understand international law”). In the 
international law context, international law scholarship is specifically turned 
to as a source of law. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(d), 
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (establishing a role for “the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law”); Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700–08 
(1900) (noting the role of scholarly writings in determining customary interna-
tional law). 
 84. Few articles broadly discuss these changes. For a particularly strong 
analysis, see Nico Krisch, More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and 
US Predominance in International Law, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte 
eds., 2003) (describing the U.S. shift from international law to domestic law as 
a tool of foreign policy). 
 85. William H. Taft, IV, Address, A View from the Top: American Perspec-
tives on International Law After the Cold War, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 503, 503 
(2006); see also PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY (2000) 
(arguing that the Nuremberg trials exemplified U.S. efforts to replace retribu-
tive violence with international law); STANLEY MEISLER, UNITED NATIONS: 
THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS (1995) (describing the successes and failures of the 
United Nations, and how the institution grew from its founding after World 
War II). 
 86. See generally RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
CHARTER: ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940–1945 (1958) (describing the U.S. 
role in developing the UN Charter). 
 87. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1981–82; see also JACOB ROBINSON, HU-
MAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
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fact, the United States exerted its influence on an unprecedent-
ed scale.88 The immediate postwar era was thus filled with in-
stitution-building.89 And more than any other country, the 
United States was responsible for developing and promoting 
the international legal system.90 
In the 1950s, U.S. enthusiasm for international law tempo-
rarily receded as nationalist tendencies took over and interna-
tional law fell into disrepute. The 1950s were marked as a pe-
riod of isolationism, often associated with the Bricker 
Amendment.91 But by the late 1960s, and continuing into the 
1990s, the United States was an active supporter and promoter 
of international law.92 In many ways, international law (and, in 
particular, international human rights law) was instrumental 
as a tool the United States and other liberal democracies used 
to combat and contain communism.93 
 
NATIONS 48 (1946) (describing how the United States pressed for the creation 
of the Commission on Human Rights); Louis Henkin, Rights: American and 
Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 415 (1979) (noting America’s role in the de-
velopment of international human rights). 
 88. Taft, supra note 85, at 503; see also HENKIN, supra note 8, at 47 (not-
ing the relevance of international law and explaining that in the 1970s “[t]he 
number of agreements registered at the United Nations [exceeded] ten thou-
sand”; in addition, “thousands of agreements [were] in effect which [were] not 
registered at the United Nations”). 
 89. Kal Raustiala, Refining The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 423, 426 (2006) (book review). 
 90. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1982 (citing Douglas J. Sylvester, Com-
ment, Customary International Law, Forcible Abductions, and America’s Re-
turn to the “Savage State,” 42 BUFF. L. REV. 555, 612 (1994)) (“[T]he United 
States has played a tremendous role in developing the current system of in-
ternational law . . . .”). 
 91. In the 1950s, the Bricker Amendment sought to make all treaties sub-
ject to legislative implementation. Arthur E. Sutherland, Comment, The 
Bricker Amendment, Executive Agreements, and Imported Potatoes, 67 HARV. 
L. REV. 281, 282–85 (1953); see also Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human 
Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 343 
n.11 (1995). 
 92. Brunnée, supra note 51, at 620–22 (describing U.S. commitment to 
multilateral environmental treaties in the 1970s and 1980s); Kennedy, supra 
note 56, at 341–42 (“[A]fter about 1960, the [international law] field entered a 
third period of self-confident renewal, consolidating an updated, pragmatic, 
and liberal internationalism.”); Taft, supra note 85, at 503–04 (describing the 
U.S. influence on international law after World War II and before the Cold 
War). 
 93. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 66, at 234–35 (describing how human 
rights developed as “inseparable from the Cold War strategy linked to the so-
called foreign policy establishment”). Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for exam-
ple, used international law during the Cold War to prevent a crisis over the 
control of Berlin between the Soviet Union, East Germany, and the West. In 
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In recent decades, however, the United States has re-
treated from international law and its institutions.94 Scholars 
have described the American disengagement from multilateral 
treaties and its international legal obligations as “dazzlingly 
broad.”95 And as one UN organization explains: although “the 
United States was one of the driving forces behind establishing 
the United Nations in 1945 and initiated many of the multila-
teral treaties that have encouraged cooperation on our planet, 
there has been a steady decline in the U.S. government’s sup-
port of the UN and the agreements it helped establish.”96 In the 
last decade, the United States has opposed a number of widely 
accepted multilateral treaties, failed to comply with interna-
tional law in its War on Terrorism, and has withdrawn from 
several other significant treaties. In other contexts, the United 
States is accused of unilaterally rewriting (or at least reinter-
 
talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador 
Anatoly Dobrynin, Dean Rusk “asserted in formal terms the Allied rights in 
Berlin and the Soviet’s inability under international law to bargain those 
rights away in any treaty with East Germany.” Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Dean 
Rusk and International Law, 90 ASIL PROC. 224, 156 (1996). Khrushchev ul-
timately removed the deadline for evacuating Berlin, and Rusk continued the 
talks in Moscow. “Rusk’s strategy of ‘exploratory talks’ on the legal status of 
Berlin successfully defused the crisis.” Id. at 156. 
 94. See Esty, supra note 49, at 1493 & n.3, 1494 (describing how both the 
political left and right distrust international institutions and law, and noting 
the U.S. withdrawal from the Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, its refusal to ratify treaties on the global landmine ban, and its ob-
struction of the World Health Organization’s public campaign aimed at smok-
ing). Scholars have widely recognized and discussed the withdrawal. See, e.g., 
David D. Caron, Between Empire and Community: The United States and Mul-
tilateralism 2001–2003: A Mid-Term Assessment, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 395, 
395 (2003) (“The basic underlying assertion in this muddy torrent is that the 
United States has changed its attitude and practice toward multilateralism 
dramatically . . . .”); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s 
‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647, 
670 (2006) (describing the United States’ “decidedly uneasy relationship with 
international legal norms and institutions” and listing examples of U.S. with-
drawal); Greenberg, supra note 25, at 1815 (listing U.S. withdrawal from a 
number of multilateral treaties); Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. 
L. REV. 1579, 1623–25 (2005) (“[T]he United States has recently refrained 
from ratifying—or has withdrawn from—numerous multilateral agreements 
that are widely ratified by other nations and that it at one time championed.”). 
 95. Chander, supra note 4, at 1197. 
 96. PATRICIA JUREWICZ & KRISTIN DAWKINS, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE 
POL’Y, THE TREATY DATABASE: A MONITOR OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL 
AFFAIRS iii (Sept. 2004), http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/un/2004/ 
09database.pdf. 
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preting narrowly) international conventions to shore up Ameri-
can sovereignty.97 
One can argue over the degree of disengagement, but cer-
tainly the United States has lost enthusiasm for multilateral 
legal commitments through negotiated treaties. In recent 
years, the United States has reversed its support for at least 
six major treaties,98 including the Kyoto Protocol on Climate 
Change,99 the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,100 the Optional 
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,101 
the Biological Weapons Convention,102 the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons Treaty,103 and the treaty creating the Inter-
national Criminal Court.104 It has ratified only three of the ele-
 
 97. PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND 
BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES 227–28, 233 (2005) (arguing that the Bush Ad-
ministration had “such scant regard for the international rule of law” that af-
ter 9/11 it believed “the rewriting of international conventions could be 
achieved unilaterally” and therefore would “trash an international treaty by 
arguing that it posed a threat to American sovereignty”). 
 98. JUREWICZ & DAWKINS, supra note 96, at iii (describing the U.S. with-
drawal from key international treaty regimes); see also Isaac Baker, Rogue 
State? U.S. Spurns Treaty After Treaty, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 8, 2005, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/un/2005/1208ambivalent.htm (naming sev-
eral treaties rejected by the U.S. government). 
 99. Resnik, supra note 7, at 1645 (describing the U.S. withdrawal from 
the Kyoto Protocol). 
 100. Guy Taylor, Missile-Defense Shield Fails Test Launch of Interceptor, 
WASH. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2004, at A13 (noting U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty). 
 101. See Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial 
Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A16. 
 102. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Allergic Reaction: Washington’s Response 
to the BWC Protocol, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, July–Aug. 2001, at 3, 3 (discuss-
ing the United States’ rejection of the Protocol to the Biological Weapons Con-
vention); Arshad Mohammed, Plans Focus on Germ Warfare, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 2, 2001, at A7 (stating that the Bush administration re-
jected a long-discussed plan to enforce the treaty). 
 103. See, e.g., Erik A. Cornellier, In the Zone: Why the United States Should 
Sign the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, 12 PAC. 
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 233, 234 (2003); see also Wade Boese, Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty Meeting Sputters, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, July–Aug. 2005, at 22 
(describing the withdrawal); Lawrence J. Korb, Nuclear Proliferation: Bush’s 
Policy Endangers U.S. Security, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Aug. 9, 2004, at 6 
(same).  
 104. Letter from John R. Bolton, former U.S. Under Sec’y of State for Arms 
Control and Int’l Sec., to Kofi Annan, Sec’y-Gen. of the United Nations (Apr. 
27, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 1014. Immediately after the Bush Administration took of-
fice a flood of commentary sought to pressure Bush to unsign the treaty. See, 
e.g., John R. Bolton, Unsign That Treaty, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2001, at A21; 
Betsy Pisik, Conservatives Prepare to Contest Global Court: View Treaty as 
Threat to U.S. Military, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2001, at A1; see also Cuéllar, 
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ven key environmental treaties, and only five of the twelve ma-
jor human rights treaties.105 As one commentator bluntly puts 
it: “the list of U.N. treaties and conventions that Washington 
has not signed or has actively opposed goes on and on.”106 In 
fact, “only the free-trade agreements—provided they are li-
mited to trade and do not include the environment, labor is-
sues, or human rights” have “pass[ed] muster . . . because they 
are thought to serve American interests.”107 
The disengagement is even more marked when U.S. prac-
tices are compared with those of other states. The United 
States is the only country aside from Somalia (which currently 
has no sitting government) that has failed to ratify the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child.108 The United States was one of 
only seven countries that voted against the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.109 And it was one of only two 
countries that voted against UNESCO’s Convention on the Pro-
tection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expres-
sions.110 Strikingly, since World War II, the United States has 
joined as a party “only 60 percent of the treaties deposited with 
the UN Secretary-General that have been ratified by more than 
 
supra note 35, at 1597. 
 105. JUREWICZ & DAWKINS, supra note 96, at iv; see also Taft, supra note 
85, at 504 (“The United States did not ratify any of the major international 
treaties it had declined to join in the previous decade. Nor, with a few excep-
tions involving cooperation in law enforcement, did it engage in and promote 
the negotiation of conventions on new subjects.”). 
 106. Baker, supra note 98; see also Brunnée, supra note 51, at 624 (describ-
ing the American withdrawal from international environmental treaties); 
John E. Noyes, The United States, the Law of the Sea Convention, and Free-
dom of Navigation, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2005). 
 107. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists, supra note 1, at 10; see also SANDS, su-
pra note 97, at 21 (arguing that despite withdrawal from other international 
laws, the United States “is broadly committed to international free trade 
rules” and “is strongly committed to the use of international laws to protect 
the rights of American investors overseas, and to rules protecting intellectual 
property rights”); Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Un-
equal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 369, 389 (2005) (noting how treaties of an “economic character” have 
been viewed favorably by the United States); Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1983 
(“At the same time, however, in one major domain, the United States has been 
as consistent and devoted a champion of international law as any other coun-
try: economics.”).  
 108. JUREWICZ & DAWKINS, supra note 96, at iv. 
 109. Baker, supra note 98. 
 110. Id. 
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half of all states,” while the other G-8 members are party to 93 
percent of them.111 
Contrary to some popular misconceptions, this is not a 
phenomenon unique to the Bush Administration. Anti-
internationalism “runs deep in the American political tradi-
tion.”112 Although certainly exaggerated during the George W. 
Bush Administration113—and in particular in its war on terror-
ism114—the United States’ uneasy relationship with multila-
teral treaties began in the mid-1990s.115 In the early 1990s, on 
 
 111. Krisch, supra note 107, at 388. 
 112. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists, supra note 1, at 9; see also Krisch, su-
pra note 107, at 389 (“U.S. reluctance to international treaties has strong cul-
tural roots, goes back to the late 18th century when the country was still 
weak, and finds expression in the high hurdles erected by the U.S. Constitu-
tion for treaty ratification.”). 
 113. Greenberg, supra note 25, at 1814–15 (“The administration of Presi-
dent George W. Bush stands out as a uniquely aggressive and extreme propo-
nent of a normative realist paradigm in international affairs. This paradigm is 
trumpeted to explain and justify U.S. actions to abandon, terminate, or sabo-
tage a number of the most prominent bilateral and multilateral treaties in ef-
fect or development for decades.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World 
Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2354 (2006) (“America’s new diplomatic strategy 
emphasizes strategic unilateralism and tactical multilateralism, characterized 
by a broad antipathy toward international law and global regime-building 
through treaty negotiation.”); see also Global Policy Forum, U.S., UN, and In-
ternational Law, http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/un/unindex.htm (last vi-
sited Dec. 1, 2008) (“The Bush Administration has embarked on a strategy of 
hard line unilateralism, disregarding the UN and international law.”). 
 114. See Bryant G. Garth, Rebuilding International Law After the Septem-
ber 11th Attacks: Contrasting Agendas of High Priests and Legal Realists, 4 
LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 3, 3–4 (2006) (explaining how after 9/11, the Bush 
Administration believed “[i]nternational law needed to be put in the service of 
the War on Terror or ignored” and detailing a “series of anti-international law 
decisions”); see generally SANDS, supra note 97, at 227 (criticizing the United 
States for its withdrawal from international norms); Michael C. Davis, Inter-
national Intervention in an Age of Crisis and Terror: U.N. Reform and Region-
al Practice, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 20–21 (2006) (describing the United 
States’ “disregard for international law” in a range of contexts and in particu-
lar in the war against terrorism). 
 115. Thomas M. Franck, Editorial Comment, Taking Treaties Seriously, 82 
AM. J. INT’L L. 67, 67 (1988) (explaining that the “United States seems increa-
singly content to be perceived by other nations as indifferent to its most so-
lemn treaty obligations”); Detlev F. Vagts, Editorial Comment, Taking Trea-
ties Less Seriously, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 458, 458–60 (1998) (describing an 
“alarming exacerbation” of the United States’ failure to fully respect its treaty 
obligations in the 1990s); see also JUREWICZ & DAWKINS, supra note 96, at iv 
(explaining that the retreat from engaging with international treaty law “pre-
dates the presidency of George W. Bush” and is a trend that has occurred “un-
der both Democratic and Republican leadership”); Taft, supra note 85, at 504 
(arguing that although an “acceleration of international cooperation” was ex-
pected after the Cold War ended, the “1990s revealed a loss of enthusiasm in 
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the heels of the Cold War, a great enthusiasm for international 
law and institutions existed.116 But by the mid-1990s, this op-
timism subsided. The United States declined to become a party 
to a number of key conventions,117 including the Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (which had been revised specifically to ad-
dress U.S. concerns),118 the Basel Convention,119 the Kyoto Pro-
 
the United States for multilateral approaches”); James Traub & Joanne J. 
Meyers, The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American 
World Power, (Nov. 2006), http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/un/2006/ 
1115annanbook.htm (“The critique of the United States in the United Nations, 
as being scornful of the United Nations and of its obligations there, long pre-
dates the Bush Administration, but specifically its modern form really comes 
from the mid-1990s . . . .”); cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 4 (arguing that American 
unilateralism with international law and foreign relations is hardly new, and 
not unique to the Bush administration). 
 116. It was in the summer of 1989 that Francis Fukuyama famously de-
clared the “end of history.” Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, NAT’L 
INT., Summer 1989, at 3, 3 (trumpeting, in hindsight mistakenly, the triumph 
of democracy); see also George H. W. Bush, President of the United States, 
Address to Joint Session of Congress and the Nation: Toward a New World 
Order (Sept. 11, 1990), available at http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/war/ 
bushsr.htm (declaring the beginning of a “new world order”); cf. Eyal Benve-
nisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and 
the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 595 (2007) (not-
ing how the end of the Cold War suggested to international legal theorists that 
the international system was undergoing a process of economic and political 
transformation that would soon result in a more integrated, democratized and 
egalitarian global legal order); W. Michael Reisman, International Law After 
the Cold War, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 859, 860–61 (1990) (arguing that the Cold 
War “deformed the traditional international law” and how some suppressed 
practices could now be revived). 
 117. Taft, supra note 85, at 504, 508 (“The United States’s increasing reluc-
tance to become a party to treaties establishing new international legal com-
mitments, its recent enthusiasm for Security Council resolutions imposing le-
gal obligations on states designed to combat terrorists and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, and its selective approach to the application of 
customary laws of war in its conflict with al Qaeda all represent significant 
departures from its practice in the decades of the Cold War.”); see also SANDS, 
supra note 97, at 227 (noting that the Bush Administration’s retreat from in-
ternational law was “not so much a change of values as a ratcheting up of ef-
forts to tap into a rich seam of skepticism which had lain dormant for much of 
the twentieth century, slowing but not halting the incoming tide of global 
commitments”); Davis, supra note 114, at 18–19 (“The trend of projecting 
American power to advance a perception of the common good with uncertain 
regard for international obligations was, it should be acknowledged, already 
on display in the Kosovo intervention of the Clinton Administration and 
NATO.”).  
 118. Taft, supra note 85, at 504; see also BENJAMIN FRIEDMAN & DANIEL 
FRIEDMAN, BIPARTISAN SECURITY GROUP, HOW THE LAW OF THE SEA CON-
VENTION BENEFITS THE UNITED STATES (2004), http://www.gsinstitute.org/ 
docs/11-20-04_UNCLOS.pdf (describing how President Reagan refused to sign 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea because Part XI of the 
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tocol,120 the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,121 several human 
rights conventions,122 and the Rome Statute creating the Inter-
national Criminal Court.123 And even if previous administra-
tions were more willing to undertake international obligations, 
they frequently placed conditions on those obligations.124 
The American resistance often manifested itself in at-
tempts to limit obligations flowing from treaties through the 
frequent use of reservations.125 In the 1990s the United States 
 
treaty required U.S. companies to give away to developing countries technolo-
gies developed to extract materials from the seabed). After twelve years of ne-
gotiation, an agreement was reached in 1994 that “repealed the treaty’s man-
datory technology transfer provisions” and “allow[ed] the United States to veto 
any proposed rules relating to the distribution of ISA revenues, were it to join 
the Convention.” Id. at 2. Although President Clinton signed the treaty, the 
Senate has not yet ratified it. Id. 
 119. The Basel Convention entered into force in 1992. The “United States 
remains the only OECD country not to have ratified the treaty.” Brunnée, su-
pra note 51, at 624. 
 120. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
 121. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439 
(1996); see also Warren Hoge, Blix Faults U.S. Over Failure to Halt Spread of 
Atomic Arms, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), June 2, 2006, at 8. 
 122. See, e.g., United Nations General Assembly: Optional Protocols to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Por-
nography, May 16, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1285; United Nations Commission on Hu-
man Rights: Draft Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, Apr. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 891. 
 123. Jean Galbraith, The Bush Administration’s Response to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 683, 684–86 (2003) (describing 
the Clinton Administration’s “ambivalent engagement” with the development 
of the ICC, and noting that President Clinton waited and did not sign the trea-
ty until the last possible day on December 31, 2000). 
 124. Elizabeth M. Bruch, Whose Law is It Anyway? The Cultural Legitima-
cy of International Human Rights in the United States, 73 TENN. L. REV. 669, 
672 n.13 (2006); see also SANDS, supra note 97, at 14 (describing how in the 
1990s for the United States, “[t]reaties were negotiated, but not signed [and] 
[m]any that were signed were not ratified”); Brunnée, supra note 51, at 648 
(noting that the “ratification trajectory of the Bush administration is no worse 
than that of preceding administrations”); David Sloss, The Domestication of 
International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human 
Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 139–42 (1999) (describing the history 
of U.S. ratification of human rights treaties). 
 125. Krisch, supra note 107, at 388–89 (“[T]he practice of reservations is so 
important to the U.S. that the Senate has urged the President not to accept 
any treaty provision excluding them.”); see also JOSEPH D. BECKER, THE 
AMERICAN LAW OF NATIONS: PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AMERICAN 
COURTS 41 (2001) (“In [the 1990s] the United States . . . adopted the practice 
of attaching reservations (or their equivalent) to ratified treaties . . . .”); Mar-
garet E. McGuinness, Medellín, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration 
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was much slower to ratify treaties compared to previous dec-
ades.126 
This is not to criticize the United States for its refusal to 
participate in a particular treaty regime. Nor is it to suggest 
that international law does not play a significant role in U.S. 
relations; the United States regularly uses international law 
(at least when attempting to influence other countries’ beha-
vior).127 The point is for now simply a descriptive one: the last 
decade witnessed a dramatic change of perspective.128 Overall 
the United States (at least the executive and legislative 
branches) has disengaged from traditional international law-
making, and is increasingly reluctant to become a party to trea-
ties establishing new international commitments. As one au-
thor notes, “international law relating to a number of subjects 
seems to be neither as easy to make nor as important to make 
for the United States, at least in the near term, as it was pre-
viously.”129 
B. THE RISE OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
This disengagement from international law left a vacuum. 
As the United States withdrew from international treaties and 
the institutions created by those treaties, international lawyers 
turned elsewhere to find solutions to international challenges, 
and to project American influence. The need to do so was felt 
acutely as globalization increased the likelihood and intensity 
of international conflicts.130 As lawyers turned to the courts, 
 
of International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 759 (2006) 
(“[T]he United States . . . has become more sophisticated in its use of reserva-
tions, understandings and declarations to limit its obligations under the cen-
tral human rights regimes . . . .”). 
 126. Brunnée, supra note 51, at 648. 
 127. See SEAN D. MURPHY, 2 UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 2002–2004, at 1 (2006) (“[D]uring 2002–2004, the United States contin-
ued in its role as a critical player with respect to international legal initiatives 
and as a major supporter of a variety of international organizations . . . .”); cf. 
Koh, supra note 31, at 1487 (“[T]he United States remains the only superpow-
er capable, and at times willing, to commit real resources and make real sacri-
fices to build, sustain, and drive an international system committed to inter-
national law, democracy, and the promotion of human rights.”); Rubenfeld, 
supra note 4, at 1972 (describing “America’s can’t-live-with-it, can’t-kill-it rela-
tionship to international law” and the apparent inconsistency of the U.S. posi-
tion towards international law). 
 128. SANDS, supra note 97, at 21 (noting a “wholesale change of approach”). 
 129. Taft, supra note 85, at 508. 
 130. See David J. Gerber, Prescriptive Authority: Global Markets as a Chal-
lenge to National Regulatory Systems, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 287, 298 (2004) 
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the U.S. legal system began to export, if not globalize, its brand 
of justice.131 And then—quite recently and often unnoticed—
other countries began to follow suit.132 
1. Transnational Litigation in the United States 
Extraterritoriality133 concerns the circumstances under 
which one state’s laws can appropriately apply to conduct oc-
curring outside that state’s territory.134 According to the United 
Nation’s, “traditionally, the exercise of jurisdiction by a state 
was “primarily limited to persons, property and acts within its 
territory and to relatively exceptional situations in which its 
nationals travelled beyond its borders.”135 A state’s power—and 
 
(“[Global markets] enhance pressure on [jurisdictional law] by increasing the 
likelihood, intensity, and potential consequences of conflicts among states and, 
to a growing extent, among international and transnational institutions.”) For 
further discussion on the impact of globalization, see THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, 
THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999). 
 131. Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty—U.S. Litigation in the Mirror 
of International Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 628 (2002). 
 132. See infra notes 191–211 and accompanying text. As a general matter, 
the number of transnational cases of all kinds in U.S. courts continues to grow 
rapidly. Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
1456, 1459 (1991) (describing increased international litigation in U.S. courts); 
see also Eugene J. Silva, Practical Views on Stemming the Tide of Foreign 
Plaintiffs and Concluding Mid-Atlantic Settlements, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 479, 
480 (1993) (describing the sustained growth of multinational litigation); cf. 
Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction Over 
Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 42–46 (2006) (de-
scribing the growth of international litigation involving foreigners in U.S. 
courts). 
 133. See supra note 15. For a detailed discussion of the extraterritorial ap-
plication of U.S. laws, see Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial 
Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1 (1992). 
 134. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(“Extraterritoriality is essentially, and in common sense, a jurisdictional con-
cept concerning the authority of a nation to adjudicate the rights of particular 
parties and to establish the norms of conduct applicable to events or persons 
outside its borders.”); see also VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 8:1 (2d ed. 2008) (“Extraterri-
torial jurisdiction seeks to define those instances where the United States will 
apply its laws to international transactions, while recognizing the potential 
conflict with foreign nations.”). 
 135. U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission, 
Annex E, at 516, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006) [hereinafter International Law 
Commission], available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2006/2006report 
.htm; see also GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 563–67 (4th ed. 2007) (describing tra-
ditional international law limitations on extraterritoriality); CURTIS A. BRAD-
LEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 625 (2d ed. 2005) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has applied a presumption against extraterritoriality since 
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in turn, the power of its courts—ended at the border.136 The 
reason for this was sound: a state’s extension of its lawmaking 
authority137 into the territory of another state “contravene[s] 
[that] state’s sovereignty”.138 That states enjoy exclusive au-
thority to regulate within their borders is a cornerstone of clas-
sical international law.139 Thus, historically, “regulation of 
extraterritorial conduct was viewed as illegitimate.”140 
For a long time these principles were respected in the 
United States. Domestic law applied only within state borders 
 
early in the nation’s history.”). 
 136. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) 
(“[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as 
lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where 
the act is done.”), abrogated by United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 
268 (1927); Case of S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 
18–19 (Sept. 7) (“Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by interna-
tional law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to 
the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of 
another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be 
exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule 
derived from international custom or from a convention.”). The territorial limi-
tation has not always existed. In England, prior to the creation of the monar-
chial state, no concept of territorial sovereignty existed. See M’Gonigle, supra 
note 52, at 166–67; John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problema-
tizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 149–50 (1993). 
 137. This is known as prescriptive jurisdiction, or sometimes legislative ju-
risdiction. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401(a) (1987) 
(defining prescriptive jurisdiction). 
 138. Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Juris-
diction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 127 (2007). 
 139. Id.; see also John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to 
an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 786–87 (2003) (describing the 
concepts of state sovereignty and independence). For a discussion of internal 
and external sovereignty, see Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding In-
sult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1921–23 (2003). The United Nations Charter recognizes 
the right to be free from interference from other states. U.N. Charter art. 2, 
para. 4 (providing that states have an obligation to respect the “territorial in-
tegrity or political independence” of other states). 
 140. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 251, 268 (2006). As Professor Dubinsky notes, the territorial limits on 
the power of courts to adjudicate disputes involving conduct outside a nation’s 
borders has had “many manifestations: the dominance of the doctrine of lex 
loci delicti (the law of the place of wrong) in choice of law, the presumptive ter-
ritorial limits of prescriptive jurisdiction, the breadth of the act of state doc-
trine, and the great stinginess with which res judicata and collateral estoppel 
were applied across borders.” Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets 
Private Law Harmonization: The Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 255 
(2005). 
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to persons within the United States,141 as did constitutional 
protections.142 And even when the strict prohibition against re-
gulating foreign conduct eventually eroded, a strong presump-
tion remained that U.S. laws would not apply outside U.S. bor-
ders.143 In fact, Justice Holmes proclaimed this presumption 
almost a century ago: “the general and almost universal rule is 
that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be de-
termined wholly by the law of the country where the act is 
done.”144 Accordingly, U.S. courts traditionally would be very 
reluctant to find a U.S. law that applied extraterritorially.145 
Today, however, the use of U.S. domestic law to regulate 
conduct occurring beyond U.S. borders has become increasingly 
common.146 According to Professor Krisch, the United States 
 
 141. Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) (“The laws of no nation 
can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own 
citizens. They can have no force to control the sovereignty or rights of any oth-
er nation, within its own jurisdiction.”); see also Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (limiting the legislative powers to control 
conduct within a nation’s territorial borders); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 
Cranch) 241, 279 (1807) (taking a territorial approach to prescriptive jurisdic-
tion), partially overruled by Hudson v. Guestier, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281 (1810). 
For a discussion of the presumption against U.S. domestic laws applying 
extraterritorially from a U.S. perspective, see William S. Dodge, Understand-
ing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85 
(1998); Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and the 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598 (1990). 
 142. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2501, 2506 (2005) (“[T]he protections of the Bill of Rights are not unte-
thered from the territory of the United States. Rather, they are spatially 
bound: operative only within the fifty states and other territories . . . .”). For a 
general discussion of the limitations of constitutional protections outside terri-
torial boundaries, see Parrish, supra note 132, at 28–41. 
 143. See EEOC v. Arabian Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), partially su-
perseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a) (co-
dified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f ) (2006)), as recognized in Landgraf v. 
USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 
285 (1949) (explaining that the presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. laws is a canon of statutory construction); Am. Banana Co. v. 
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356–59 (1909) (explaining the strong presump-
tion against extraterritorial application as a means to prevent the violation of 
another nation’s sovereignty), abrogated by United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 
274 U.S. 268 (1927). For an in depth discussion of the history of extraterritori-
al jurisdiction under domestic law, see Austen L. Parrish, The Effects Test: 
Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455 (2008). 
 144. Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 356; see also F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. 
v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (“[T]his Court ordinarily construes 
ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign au-
thority of other nations.”). 
 145. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 134, § 8:3. 
 146. International Law Commission, supra note 135, at 516; cf. Jenny S. 
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“took an early lead in applying its own law to situations with 
little connection to itself other than a widely defined ‘effect,’ 
and it has succeeded in reshaping (or at least destabilizing)” 
traditional jurisdictional constraints.147 A whole host of 
grounds for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction now exists in 
both international and domestic law.148 Although the tradition-
al limits on extraterritorial laws began loosening in the early 
decades of the twentieth century,149 the number of transnation-
al cases—where domestic laws are applied to govern extraterri-
torial conduct—has dramatically exploded only recently.150 In 
fact, that U.S. courts extraterritorially apply U.S. and interna-
tional law151 to solve transboundary disputes is now unexcep-
tional.152 This is true for both lawsuits concerning transnation-
 
Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 
430 (2003) (“National courts, too, are increasingly being called upon to apply 
international law and to interact with these international courts and with the 
courts of other nations.”). 
 147. Krisch, supra note 107, at 403; see also Ugo Mattei & Jeffrey Lena, 
U.S. Jurisdiction Over Conflicts Arising Outside of the United States: Some 
Hegemonic Implications, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 381, 382 (2001) 
(“[T]he expansionist thrust of the jurisdiction of U.S. courts . . . may be viewed 
as a sort of legal imperialism . . . .”). 
 148. See LOUISE ELLEN TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION § 2-4(a) (1996) 
(listing traditional grounds for the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction). 
 149. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 135, at 567; Born, supra note 133, at 1 
(“During the course of the twentieth century, territorial limits on national ju-
risdiction gradually eroded.”). 
 150. See Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?, 
25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1297, 1300 (2004) (describing the expanding num-
ber of transnational cases); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 
75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 186–91 (1996) (describing the rise of transnational litiga-
tion and the broader theory); see generally R.E. FALVEY & P.J. LLOYD, AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 1 (1999) (“Some governments 
apply national laws extraterritorially and these applications are increas-
ing . . . .”). For an interesting discussion of transnational law, see Lawrence M. 
Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law, 32 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 65 (1996). 
 151. See Stephan, supra note 131, at 628, 631–39 (describing how U.S. 
courts have sought to widen their international influence through “shifts in 
doctrines such as personal jurisdiction, forum non coveniens, comity, and 
choice of law”). For further discussion of extraterritoriality in general, see 
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 135; NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 134. 
 152. In recent years, U.S. courts have extraterritorially applied a wide 
range of domestic laws. Phillip B. Dye et al., International Litigation, 40 INT’L 
LAW. 275, 299–303 (2006) (listing cases in the past year where U.S. courts 
have “considered extraterritoriality in disputes involving the federal habeas 
corpus statute, as well as intellectual property, antitrust, securities, employ-
ment, disabilities, tort claims, criminal law, and immigration issues”). For an 
early description of the United States’ use of extraterritorial laws, see V. Rock 
Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of United 
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al public law153 and lawsuits concerning private regulatory 
law.154 
The move toward U.S. domestic courts serving as fora for 
international matters (rather than their international counter-
parts) is significant. A mindset has developed among many 
U.S. lawyers and policymakers that the extraterritorial appli-
cation of American law is not only acceptable, but preferable.155 
Instead of turning to international treaties or international in-
stitutions to solve international challenges, parties increasingly 
see domestic litigation as a more immediate and effective 
means of obtaining redress for global harms.156 Use of extrater-
ritorial domestic law is also a way to exert American influence 
without having to worry about the constraints and mutual obli-
gations that international treaties impose157—a particularly 
strong form of American exceptionalism.158 The trend is wide-
spread. From antitrust,159 to copyright,160 to securities regula-
 
States Law, 14 INT’L LAW. 257, 257–66 (1980). 
 153. For a general description of transnational public law, see Koh, Trans-
national Public Law Litigation, supra note 11, at 2347. 
 154. See Buxbaum, supra note 140, at 253–56 (analyzing the development 
of transnational regulatory law). 
 155. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 4, at 1246 (arguing that American law 
is preferable to raw international law). For the idea that law can create a 
mindset over time, see Paul Schiff Berman, Dialectical Regulation, Territorial-
ity, and Pluralism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 929, 945 (2006) (“[T]he mere assertion of 
jurisdiction and articulation of a norm (even without literal enforcement pow-
er) has such great impact that it effectively alters legal consciousness over 
time.”); Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 
84 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1268 (2006) (arguing how law can effect “legal con-
sciousness” over time). 
 156. See Krisch, supra note 84, at 156, 162–63 (explaining the use of U.S. 
courts as international courts, and how from a “U.S. perspective, law is an im-
portant device for the regulation of international society—as long as it is not 
applied to itself ”). 
 157. See id.  
 158. See Hathaway, supra note 32, at 132 (“American [exceptionalism] is 
. . . used to ‛plead the authority of its internal law to mitigate its international 
legal obligations.’ . . . The United States simultaneously asserts the right to 
lead, but also to be exempted from the rules it promotes.” (citing Henry J. 
Richardson, The Execution of Angel Breard by the United States: Violating an 
Order of the International Court of Justice, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 121, 
127 (1998))). 
 159. Salil K. Mehra, Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement and the Myth of 
International Consensus, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 191, 191–92 (1999) (ar-
guing that due to changes in the law in the 1990s U.S. antitrust laws will in-
creasingly address overseas conduct); see also Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterrito-
riality in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 159 
(1999) (“Extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust and competition laws has 
become routine in both the United States and the European Union.”). 
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tion,161 to trademarks and trade names,162 to intellectual prop-
erty,163 to corporate law and governance,164 to bankruptcy and 
tax,165 to criminal laws,166 to environmental laws,167 to civil 
 
 160. Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in Copy-
right Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 592–99 (1997) (describing recent ex-
amples of the extraterritorial application of copyright law). 
 161. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 134, §§ 8:19–24. For further discus-
sion on the extraterritorial application of securities regulation, see Stephen J. 
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Se-
curities Laws, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207 (1996); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew 
T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Secur-
ities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV 903 (1998); Margaret V. Sachs, The Interna-
tional Reach of Rule 10b-5: The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 677 (1990). 
 162. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 134, § 8:12. 
 163. Curtis A. Bradley, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Intellectual 
Property Law Territoriality Panel Principal Paper: Territorial Intellectual 
Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 506–07 (1997) 
(describing the increasing extraterritorial application of U.S. intellectual 
property laws); see also Katherine E. White, The Recent Expansion of Extrater-
ritoriality in Patent Infringement, 11 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2, 2 (“The rapid pace 
of globalization has intensified the desire to expand the territorial reach of 
United States law to determine patent infringement.”). For recent examples of 
cases, see Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(finding patent infringement where exported software components were used 
solely abroad); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(holding a copier liable for U.S. patent infringement for foreign copying of 
U.S.-made software), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007); NTP, Inc. v. Research in 
Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding patent infringement in 
the U.S. even though part of the patented system was located in Canada). 
 164. Detlev F. Vagts, Extraterritoriality and the Corporate Governance 
Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 289, 289–94 (2003) (describing the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). For further analysis of the extraterritori-
al application of corporate law, see Ronald E. Bornstein & N. Elaine Dugger, 
International Regulation of Insider Trading, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 375 
(1987); Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of For-
eign Tender Offers, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 523 (1993); and Mark Gibney & R. David 
Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law and the Protec-
tion of Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations to Domestic and 
International Standards, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 123 (1996). 
 165. Buxbaum, supra note 140, at 278–80 (describing the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law in tax revenue litigation); see also Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, 
Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 5, 17–24 
(2003) (describing extraterritorial laws in the corruption, bankruptcy, and tax 
contexts). 
 166. Colangelo, supra note 138, at 121 (“[T]he United States now extends 
aggressively its criminal laws to activity occurring halfway around the 
globe.”). For examples of cases concerning the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. criminal law, see United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991). For a specific analysis 
of the application of RICO laws, see Kelly Christie, To Apply or Not to Apply: 
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rights,168 to labor169—the list goes on170—the United States has 
utilized prescriptive (i.e., legislative) jurisdiction to regulate 
conduct occurring abroad.171 U.S. domestic laws, applied extra-
 
Extraterritorial Application of Federal RICO Laws, 8 FLA. J. INT’L. L. 131 
(1993). 
 167. See Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Déjà Vu: Extraterritoriality, In-
ternational Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-
U.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363, 393–95 
(2005) (describing the extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental laws); 
see also Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1077–79 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (holding that the imposition of CERCLA liability on a Canadian 
corporation was not an extraterritorial application of U.S. law even though the 
company’s release of pollutants occurred entirely within Canada). See general-
ly Francesco Francioni, Extraterritorial Application of Environmental Law, in 
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 122 (Karl M. 
Meessen ed., 1996) (arguing that the extraterritorial application of U.S. envi-
ronmental laws supports fundamental human rights). 
 168. See, e.g., NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 134, § 8:3 (“In 1984 Congress 
expanded the ADEA to permit limited extraterritorial application to U.S. citi-
zens working for U.S. companies or their subsidiaries.”); cf. Mattei & Lena, 
supra note 147, at 381 (describing “Holocaust claims” lawsuits where the 
“claims are temporally and spatially remote from American courts”). 
 169. See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 129–30 
(2005) (extending the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to encompass 
foreign-flag vessels in U.S. waters); Jose v. M/V Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp. 358, 
373 (D. Or. 1992) (finding that Congress intended the wage provisions of the 
U.S. Shipping Act to apply to foreign seamen); see also Symeon C. Symeonides, 
Cruising in American Waters: Spector, Maritime Conflicts, and Choice of Law, 
37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 491, 503–10 (2006) (discussing the extraterritoriality is-
sues raised by the Court’s decision in Spector, 545 U.S. 119). 
 170. NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 134, § 8:3 (“There are many laws of the 
United States that have or may have extraterritorial effect. A few of these 
laws that have invited comment are the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (deal-
ing with bribery), the Export Administration Act of 1979 (dealing with boy-
cotts), the Iranian Assets Control Regulations (dealing with response to the 
hostage crisis), the Civil Rights Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, 
and drug enforcement laws.”); see also Tonya L. Putnam, Courts Without Bor-
ders: The Domestic Sources of U.S. Extraterritorial Regulation (Mar. 5, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript presented at the annual meeting of the International 
Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii) (on file with 
author) (noting that, although there is a variation in U.S. extraterritorial reg-
ulatory behavior, U.S. courts have “applied domestic statutes extraterritorially 
to break international trading cartels; to compensate victims of torture or-
dered by foreign military officials; to restrict the re-export of sensitive mate-
rials and technologies; to protect U.S. trademarks; and to safeguard migratory 
species”). 
 171. For an early discussion of the methodological challenges associated 
with extraterritorial application of U.S. law, see Lea Brilmayer, The Extrater-
ritorial Application of American Law: A Methodical and Constitutional Ap-
praisal, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 11, 11; see also Grund-
man, supra note 152 (evaluating the receptiveness of foreign governments to 
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws in the late 1970s). 
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territorially, are now routinely used to influence international 
policy. 
To be certain, the extraterritorial application of domestic 
law is not an entirely new phenomenon. U.S. courts have long 
heard cases involving foreign elements.172 What is new is the 
extent to which it has occurred in all areas of the law, in all 
areas of the world, and how litigants now instinctively turn to 
domestic courts to solve international problems. In some con-
texts, domestic law as an instrument of international gover-
nance is beginning to replace international law. And with the 
globalization of commerce, communications, crime, human 
rights, and other areas, the prevalence of cases where domestic 
courts meddle with extraterritorial matters has grown.173 
Human rights litigation and the development of universal 
jurisdiction provide one example. Before the 1980s, the idea 
that foreign nationals could sue or be sued in U.S. courts for 
conduct occurring beyond U.S. territory was almost unheard 
of.174 In the 1980s and 1990s, however, alternatives developed 
to the traditional model of human rights enforcement.175 Signif-
icant changes occurred in a relatively short period of time,176 as 
human rights advocates made efforts to “deploy domestic courts 
around the world to implement the human rights policies not 
only of their own countries but of the international community 
as a whole.”177 Over time, U.S. courts came to accept that fo-
 
 172. Martinez, supra note 146, at 441. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 75, at 104. The change began with 
the now-famous 1980 Filártiga decision by the Second Circuit U.S. Federal 
Court of Appeals, which involved a suit by the family of a Paraguayan tor-
tured to death by the police against the torturer, who was living in the United 
States. Filártiga v. Peňa-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Beth Ste-
phens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration’s Efforts to 
Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 173–77 (2004) 
(describing the case and its progeny). 
 175. See, e.g., Aceves, supra note 11, at 139–47 (describing the development 
of transnational law litigation); William W. Burke-White, A Community of 
Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002). 
 176. Mark Gibney, Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts: A Hypocritical 
Approach, 3 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 261, 269 (1996) (“It is remarkable to think that it 
was only slightly more than a decade and a half ago that the prospects of 
bringing to trial torturers and murderers from Paraguay or Ethiopia or Indo-
nesia or Guatemala or Haiti or anywhere else seemed completely out of the 
realm of the possibility. Much has changed in a relatively short period of time. 
The U.S. has now opened its courts to those who have suffered human rights 
abuses . . . .”). 
 177. Dubinsky, supra note 140, at 216. 
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reigners could sue for violations of certain universal interna-
tional law norms.178 Under the Alien Tort Statute and other 
statutes,179 liability was imposed on a wide range of actors, 
from commanding officers, foreign government officials, U.S. 
government officials, and corporations.180 And human rights lit-
igation underwent “significant expansion, both in terms of the 
number of cases filed as well as the scope of the claims 
raised.”181 Human rights activists and scholars have actively 
encouraged this growth.182 
This phenomenon has also occurred in environmental law. 
For many environmentalists, international environmental 
lawmaking should no longer be the exclusive business of na-
tion-states.183 In a fast-paced global economy, international en-
vironmental treaties are seen as too cumbersome and slug-
 
 178. See Stephens, supra note 174, at 174. 
 179. 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2000). The Alien Tort Statute was enacted in 1789 as 
part of the first Judiciary Act. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 
77. Three other statutes also provide jurisdiction for U.S. courts to hear hu-
man rights claims: the Torture Victim Protection Act, an exception to the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act, and a provision of an antiterrorism initiative. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1350; 18 U.S.C. § 2333; 28 U.S.C. § 1330; 28 U.S.C. § 1602. See 
generally Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The Com-
parative and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 438–39 (2002) (de-
scribing the modern statutes that “provide jurisdiction for human rights 
claims in U.S. courts”). 
 180. Stephens, supra note 174, at 437. Generally, however, the U.S. and its 
employees can not be sued under the Alien Tort Statute, and therefore human 
rights litigation is asymmetrical—“by the United States, but not against it.” 
Krisch, supra note 84, at 163. 
 181. Bradley, supra note 20, at 458; see also Henry J. Steiner, Three Cheers 
for Universal Jurisdiction—Or Is It Only Two?, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES J. 
199, 210–11 (2004) (describing the “burst of activity in prosecutions based on 
universal jurisdiction”). But see Curtis F. Doebbler, An American Legend: The 
Overlegalization of Human Rights, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 381, 382 
(2002) (noting that human rights litigation “is still crawling” in parts of the 
world where it is needed most). 
 182. See Drezner, supra note 4, at 325 (“Activists have tried to use [the ex-
istence of UN and other human rights] treaties to argue that U.S. courts 
should apply human rights law beyond its borders.”); see, e.g., Gregory G.A. 
Tzeutschler, Note, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transna-
tional Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 359 (1999) (arguing in favor of transnational litigation aimed at mul-
tinationals). 
 183. See M’Gonigle, supra note 52, at 173; Russell A. Miller, Surprising 
Parallels Between Trail Smelter and the Global Climate Change Regime, in 
TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL 
SMELTER ARBITRATION 168 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 
2006) (“[T]he rise . . . of nonstate actors suggests a new world order in which 
the nation state’s Westphalian prerogative is increasingly suspect.”). 
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gish.184 From climate change litigation,185 to transboundary pol-
lution,186 to shared management of natural resources,187 inter-
national environmental lawmaking has increasingly occurred 
at the subnational or national level in U.S. courts.188 Many en-
vironmentalists cheer these developments, hoping they will en-
courage an environmental race to the top.189 Given the preva-
 
 184. See Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmo-
politan Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1105, 1134–35 (2005) (praising transna-
tional common-law adjudication because “treaties . . . are cumbersome and 
slow to adjust to changing technologies or social conditions”); Geoffrey Palmer, 
New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 259, 
259 (1992) (stating that the treaty process causes international environmental 
law to be “slow, cumbersome, expensive, uncoordinated and uncertain”); 
James Gustave Speth, Lecture, International Environmental Law: Can It Deal 
with the Big Issues?, 28 VT. L. REV. 779, 787 (2004) (describing the cumber-
some treaty-making process). 
 185. See WIL BURNS & HARI OSOFSKY, ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: 
SUBNATIONAL, NATIONAL, AND SUPRANATIONAL RESPONSES (2007); Hari M. 
Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Trans-
national Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789, 1819–27 (2005) (ana-
lyzing climate change regulations in Minnesota and Victoria, Australia); see 
also Symposium, The Role of State Attorneys General in National Environmen-
tal Law Policy, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 403, 404 (2005) (describing state at-
torneys’ general filing of innovative lawsuits to combat groundwater pollu-
tion). 
 186. See, e.g., Noah D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution: Harmonizing Inter-
national and Domestic Law, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681, 723–36 (2007) (us-
ing the U.S.-Canada example to examine the use of domestic law as a mechan-
ism for addressing transboundary pollution); Parrish, supra note 167, at 363, 
393–99 (discussing the extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental 
laws). See generally TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 183 (exploring the changing nature of state responses to transboundary 
harm). 
 187. See Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate 
Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 444 
(2006) (describing the citizen-suit provisions of the Great Lakes Compact and 
Agreement); Austen L. Parrish, Mixed Blessings: The Great Lakes Compact 
and Agreement, the IJC, and International Dispute Resolution, 2006 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 1299, 1301–02 (explaining how an agreement between eight U.S. 
states and two Canadian provinces move Great Lakes management to the 
subnational level, in part by permitting citizen suits). 
 188. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 1438–59 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. environmental statutes). See generally Martha E. Candiello, The Extra-
territorial Reach of Environmental Laws, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1235 (1997); Fran-
cioni, supra note 167, at 122–46; Anna D. Stasch, Arc Ecology v. United States 
Dep’t of the Air Force: Extending the Extraterritorial Reach of Domestic Envi-
ronmental Law, 36 ENVTL. L. 1065 (2006); Paul E. Hagen, The Extraterritorial 
Reach of U.S. Environmental Law, ALI-ABA Course of Study (2005), available 
at WL SK046 ALI-ABA 151. 
 189. Michael J. Robinson-Dorn, The Trail Smelter: Is What’s Past Prologue? 
EPA Blazes a New Trail for CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 315–19 
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lence of these kinds of cases, scholars have declared the “dawn 
of a new era” of extraterritorial transboundary environmental 
litigation.190 
2. Developing Global Extraterritoriality 
The new era of extraterritorial litigation is not limited, 
however, to American lawsuits. Transnational litigation, al-
though predominantly occurring in the United States,191 is 
spreading worldwide.192 While the United States remains the 
most active promulgator of extraterritorial measures in the 
competition/antitrust law field, other states and regional organ-
izations such as the European Union,193 France,194 Germany,195 
 
(2006) (arguing that domestic lawsuits can create a race to the top in envi-
ronmental regulation, and encouraging the extraterritorial application of do-
mestic environmental laws); see also Joel A. Gallob, Birth of the North Ameri-
can Transboundary Environmental Plaintiff: Transboundary Pollution and the 
1979 Draft Treaty for Equal Access Remedy, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 86–
87 (1991) (arguing for court-based solutions to transboundary pollution prob-
lems); cf. Noah D. Hall, Bilateral Breakdown: U.S.-Canada Pollution Disputes, 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2006, at 18, 23 (“Ideally, we could allow 
domestic litigation to resolve these disputes in a way that strengthens, not 
undermines, the United States-Canada relationship.”); Hall, supra note 186, 
at 681, 724–36 (describing how domestic litigation can be used to address 
transboundary pollution). 
 190. See Randall S. Abate, Dawn of a New Era in the Extraterritorial Ap-
plication of U.S. Environmental Statutes: A Proposal for an Integrated Judi-
cial Standard Based on the Continuum of Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 87 
(2006) (recognizing but criticizing the extraterritorial application of domestic 
environmental law); see also Rachel Kastenberg, Note, Closing the Liability 
Gap in International Transboundary Water Pollution Regime Using Domestic 
Law to Hold Polluters Accountable: A Case Study of Pakootas v. Teck Cominco 
Ltd., 7 OR. REV. INT’L L. 322, 323 (2005) (arguing that extraterritorial applica-
tion of domestic law is a “valid global solution” to transboundary pollution). 
See generally Neil Craik, Deliberation and Legitimacy in Transnational Envi-
ronmental Governance 16–18 (Inst. for Int’l Law & Justice, Working Paper 
2006/10, 2006) (describing the different forms of domestic environmental regu-
lation beyond the state). 
 191. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Enforcing International Law Through Non-
Forcible Measures, in RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 183–86 (Hague Acad. Of Int’l 
Law ed., 1997) (describing reasons for the lack of international human rights 
cases in countries other than the United States). 
 192. See Stephens, supra note 174, at 450–56 (describing extraterritorial 
civil and criminal litigation in England, Canada, Australia, Spain, France, and 
Belgium, and arguing that these sort of cases are “developing just as rapidly 
as the U.S. precedents”); cf. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo 
v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 51 (Feb. 14) (Oda, J., dissenting) (noting that “the past 
few decades have seen a gradual widening in the scope of the jurisdiction to 
prescribe law” and listing circumstances where extraterritorial criminal juris-
diction has been found to exist). 
 193. See Chad Damro, Building an International Identity: The EU and 
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the Republic of Korea,196 and most common law countries197 
have adopted laws of extraterritorial application.198 As Gary 
Born describes it, “a number of European states have begun to 
apply selected national regulatory statutes extraterritorially, 
with rigor approaching that of the United States, arousing 
complaints from both the United States and international 
businesses.”199 International and cross-border regulatory cases 
are now routinely heard in domestic courts throughout the 
world.200 In the mid-1990s, one study concluded that “more 
 
Extraterritorial Competition Policy, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 208, 208 (2001); Da-
vid J. Feeney, The European Commission’s Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over 
Corporate Mergers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 425, 427 (2002); Joseph P. Griffin, EC 
and U.S. Extraterritoriality: Activism and Cooperation, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
353 (1993); Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU Antitrust En-
forcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 159 (1999); Alexander Layton & Angharad 
M. Parry, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction—European Responses, 26 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 309, 318–22 (2003).  
 194. See Note, A Most Private Remedy: Foreign Party Suits and the U.S. 
Antitrust Laws, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2122, 2144 (2001) (“[S]everal nations, in-
cluding Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Switzerland, and Aus-
tralia, have crafted competition laws that purport to apply extraterritorially.”). 
 195. See David J. Gerber, The Extraterritorial Application of the German 
Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 756 (1983). 
 196. See Won-Ki Kim, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust 
Law and Its Adoption in Korea, 7 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 386 (2003). 
 197. See Chris Noonan, The Extraterritorial Application of New Zealand 
Competition Law, 22 N.Z.U. L. REV. 369 (2007) (describing extraterritoriality 
in New Zealand and other common law countries). 
 198. United Nations, 58th Session of the International Law Commission, 
May 1 to June 9 & July 3 to Aug. 11, 2006, Report, at 527, available at http:// 
untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2006/2006report.htm. 
 199. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 135, at 569; see also Born, supra note 
133, at 67–68 (describing extraterritorial laws in other parts of the world, in-
cluding Germany, France, Switzerland, and Japan). 
 200. See Hanno von Freyhold et al., The Role of Courts in Legal Interaction, 
in FOREIGN COURTS: CIVIL LITIGATION IN FOREIGN LEGAL CULTURES (Volk-
mar Gessner ed., 1996) (drawing conclusions from an empirical project study-
ing the contribution of domestic civil courts to the resolution of cross-border 
disputes in New York, Milan, Bremen, Hamburg, and Bremerhaven); cf. 
Adelheid Puttler, Extraterritorial Application of Criminal Law: Jurisdiction to 
Prosecute Drug Traffic Conducted by Aliens Abroad, in EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 167, at 103 (describing 
the extraterritorial application of criminal laws in the Netherlands and Ger-
many); Martin Hedemann-Robinson, Defending the Consumer’s Right to a 
Clean Environment in the Face of Globalisation: The Case of Extraterritorial 
Protection Under European Community, 23 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 25, 25–27 
(2000) (analyzing potential European extraterritorial environmental protec-
tion measures). For a discussion of a potential transnational lawsuit in Cana-
da for polluting activities occurring in the United States, see Shi-Ling Hsu & 
Austen Parrish, Litigating Canada-U.S. Transboundary Harm: International 
Environmental Lawmaking and the Threat of Extraterritorial Reciprocity, 48 
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than 100,000 (and possibly even 200,000) international dis-
putes enter[] the civil courts of first instance in Europe every 
year.”201 
Nor is the growth limited to private law or regulatory mat-
ters. Transnational public law litigation (mostly dealing with 
human rights and criminal law) is on the rise in other coun-
tries.202 Some human rights advocates have declared a new era 
of civil international human rights litigation.203 A number of 
 
VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2007). 
 201. Freyhold et al., supra note 200, at 269. 
 202. See Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recog-
nition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 149–53 (2006) 
(explaining how concepts of universal civil jurisdiction are beginning to 
emerge outside the United States); Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A 
Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for Inter-
national Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 17–27 (2002) (dis-
cussing transnational human rights litigation in other countries); Halina 
Ward, Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability Through National 
Courts: Implications and Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
451, 456–58 (2001) (listing transnational cases occurring in England, Canada, 
and Australia); Fiona McKay, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe, REDRESS, 
http://www.redress.org/documents/unijeur.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (de-
scribing the role of national courts prosecuting international crimes). For ex-
amples, see Andrea Bianchi, International Decisions: Ferrini v. Federal Re-
public of Germany, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 242, 242–45 (2005) (describing a recent 
decision in the Italian Court of Cassation in a tort case brought against Ger-
many for deportation and forced labor during World War II); Tarik-Abdel Mo-
nem, How Far Do the Lawless Areas of Europe Extend? Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 14 J. TRASNAT’L L. & 
POL’Y 159 (2005) (discussing the extent to which human rights treaty obliga-
tions extend beyond the territorial jurisdiction of states); Sabine Pittrof, Com-
pensation Claims for Human Rights Breaches Committed by German Armed 
Forces During the Second World War: Federal Supreme Court Hands Down 
Decision in the Distamo Case, 5 GERMAN L.J. 15 (2004) (discussing a decision 
by a German court in an action by Greek citizens against Germany for World 
War II conduct). Extraterritorial criminal cases using universal jurisdiction 
are also on the rise. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Uni-
versal Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1059–60 
(2004) (“[In] the past decade, criminal complaints or investigations have been 
instituted before courts in Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom for atroci-
ties in Europe, Africa and South America, . . . [and] criminal complaints have 
been filed in Belgium . . . against current or former leaders of Chad, Cuba, 
Iraq, Iran, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Ivory Coast, the Palestinian 
Authority, Israel, the United States, and other countries.”). 
 203. Bianchi, supra note 202, at 244 (describing “normative developments” 
in civil human rights litigation). For a discussion of recent cases, see Jennifer 
Levine, Note, Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation: Adjudicating on “Foreign Ter-
ritory,” 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 101, 116 (2006) (describing such cases 
as the “wave of the future” and citing cases in Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Greece, and Italy). 
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high-profile cases have been brought against foreign officials 
under universal jurisdiction.204 And the trend is not likely to 
change. Commentators argue that the number of transnational 
cases litigated outside the United States have, or should, in-
crease.205 The expectation is also that with increased extrater-
ritorial application of domestic laws, “clashes” between incon-
sistent rulings in different countries will become 
commonplace.206 
That other countries have followed the American extrater-
ritorial example is hardly surprising. Over time, the United 
States’ broad application of its own law extraterritorially has 
created a precedent (if not a sense of righteousness) in other 
countries, “who would apply their laws and their versions of in-
ternational law to Americans whose actions they do not like.”207 
Indeed, the use of extraterritorial laws by other countries has 
led to some highly publicized cases. From Internet208 and cyber-
 
 204. See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Belgium Indicts Chad’s Ex-Leader, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at A8; Belgium Restricts ‘Genocide Law,’ BBC NEWS, 
Apr. 6, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2921519.stm (describing suits 
brought against U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon); Jan Arno Hessbruegge, An Attempt to Have Secretary Rumsfeld 
and Others Indicted for War Crimes Under German Vőlkerstrafgesetzbuch, 
ASIL INSIGHT, Dec. 2004, http://www.asil.org/insight041213.cfm; Frederic L. 
Kirgis, The Pinochet Arrest and Possible Extradition to Spain, ASIL INSIGHT, 
Oct. 1998, http://www.asil.org/insigh27.cfm (describing how a Spanish investi-
gating judge issued a warrant for the arrest of former Chilean head-of-state 
Augusto Pinochet); Richard J. Wilson, Argentine Military Officers Face Trial 
in Spanish Courts, ASIL INSIGHT, Dec. 2003, http://www.asil.org/ 
insigh122.cfm (describing charges against Argentine military officers in Spain 
and also the trial of four Catholic nuns for their alleged complicity in the 1994 
Rwanda genocide). 
 205. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Expanding Remedies for Human Rights 
Abuses: Civil Litigation in Domestic Courts, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 119, 138 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000) 
(encouraging the spread of transnational human rights litigation beyond the 
United States); Aceves, supra note 11, at 134 (“[A] universal system of trans-
national law litigation would be highly effective in protecting human rights.”); 
Jordan J. Paust, Remarks at the 91st Annual Meeting of the American Society 
of International Law (April 11, 1997), in 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 259, 259 (“Na-
tional prosecutions of international crime have been more frequent and are 
increasing in number.”). 
 206. See Milena Sterio, Clash of the Titans: Collisions of Economic Regula-
tions and the Need to Harmonize Prescriptive Jurisdiction Rules, 13 U.C. DA-
VIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 95, 113–17 (2007) (calling for the harmonization of ju-
risdiction rules to prevent clashes over the extraterritorial application of 
domestic laws). 
 207. Rubin, supra note 23, at 374. 
 208. Horatia Muir Watt, Yahoo! Cyber-Collision of Cultures: Who Regu-
lates?, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 673, 675–77 (2003) (describing recent cases where 
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cases,209 to criminal prosecutions,210 to prominent human rights 
cases,211 other countries have started to use their laws as a way 
to advance their own foreign policies and to respond to the per-
ceived U.S. aspiration of special legal status. As the United 
States has stepped up its claims to extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
other countries claim “me too.” In many ways then, the use of 
domestic laws to address transnational challenges is itself be-
coming an international norm. 
III.  THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY THREAT   
The increasing propensity of states to apply domestic laws 
extraterritorially should trouble international law scholars 
(whether Sovereigntist or Internationalist in orientation) more 
than it has. When taking the aims and concerns of the Sove-
reigntists and the modern Internationalists seriously, both 
groups would be better off if they encouraged curtailing the use 
of extraterritorial laws, while reinvigorating traditional inter-
national lawmaking. The threat of extraterritoriality is a foe to 
both groups, and containing it by reclaiming international law 
is a common objective that could bridge the theoretical divide 
between them. 
 
Europe and Australia attempted to aggressively regulate content on the inter-
net and questioning whether this constitutes “extraterritorial meddling with 
[U.S.] democratic values”). 
 209. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433, 440–47 
(Austl.) (applying Australian libel laws to activity in the United States); Tri-
bunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
Nov. 20, 2000, (Fr.), available at http://juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis 
20001120.pdf, translation available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/ 
international/20001120yahoofrance.pdf (finding that French laws apply to a 
U.S. internet site selling Nazi and Third Reich paraphernalia); see also Ya-
hoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 
1224 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissing injunction that barred French order from ap-
plying in the U.S.). 
 210. See, e.g., Franks to Face Iraq Warcrimes Case, CNN, Apr. 30, 2003, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/04/29/belgium.crime/index.html?iref
=newssearch (describing a Belgium case that sought to prosecute U.S. General 
Tommy Franks); Abu Ghraib Torture Complaint Names Rumsfeld, ABC NEWS, 
Dec. 1, 2004, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200412/s1255125.htm 
(describing a criminal complaint filed in German Court against former U.S. 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld); see also Rowan Scarborough, Germany 
Dismisses War-Crimes Case Against Rumsfeld, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at 
A10 (noting that the Rumsfeld case was eventually dismissed). 
 211. One example is Iran’s reported enactment of legislation permitting 
lawsuits against the United States. See Tehran to Set Up Special Court for 
Lawsuits Against the U.S., AGENCE FRANCE–PRESSE (Paris), Nov. 15, 2000; 
Iran MPs Cry “Down with America,” Approve Lawsuits Against United States, 
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (Paris), Nov. 1, 2000. 
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A. TAKING SOVEREIGNTIST CONCERNS SERIOUSLY 
Sovereigntists should find extraterritorial domestic regula-
tion more disconcerting than classic international lawmaking 
through multilateral treaties. Global extraterritoriality calls in-
to question the Sovereigntist assumption that the United 
States, by virtue of sheer power alone, is able to shape the 
world order and protect American interests. As an initial mat-
ter, retaliation is likely in the extraterritoriality context; as Ri-
chard Falk warned over forty years ago, the use of domestic law 
in transnational litigation invites retaliation.212 To the extent 
that the United States is seen as aggressively using domestic 
law to assert its hegemony globally, we can expect that others 
will do so too.213 The impact is real: retaliation interferes with 
U.S. regulatory objectives, and also “destroy[s] a spirit of coop-
eration and common purpose in solving international economic 
problems.”214 U.S. foreign relations are similarly burdened.215 
Extraterritoriality also potentially allows law to be used for 
purely sensational rather than legal ends; in the world of extra-
territorial application of domestic law, states might manipulate 
domestic suits for their own political agendas.216 In contrast, 
 
 212. RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964). 
 213. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 461 (explaining how in the human 
rights context “other nations may retaliate by allowing suits against US gov-
ernment actors”); Grundman, supra note 152, at 258 (explaining how because 
of retaliation, U.S. multinational corporations are left in a vulnerable position) 
Stephan, supra note 131, at 655 (“The problem lies in the unwillingness of for-
eign states, including their judiciary, to go along with our project and their 
ability to sabotage it.”); see also Parrish, supra note 132, at 49–50 (describing 
retaliation “when a U.S. court provides a forum for a foreign plaintiff injured 
in his or her home nation”); Parrish, supra note 167, at 409–11 (discussing re-
ciprocity and retaliation in the context of extraterritorial environmental laws). 
 214. Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The 
Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289, 324; see also Thabo Mbeki, Presi-
dent of South Africa, Statement to the National Houses of Parliament and the 
Nation at the Tabling of the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion (Apr. 15, 2003), http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/2003/ 
tm0415.html (“[W]e consider it completely unacceptable that matters that are 
central to the future of our country should be adjudicated in foreign courts 
which bear no responsibility for the well-being of our country.”). 
 215. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 460–64 (describing the costs to U.S. for-
eign relations that human rights litigation imposes); David J. Gerber, Beyond 
Balancing: International Law Restraints on the Reach of National Laws, 10 
YALE J. INT’L L. 185, 187 (1984) (describing the negative impacts of extraterri-
torial laws); Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 75, at 106 (describing how domes-
tic human rights litigation can impact foreign affairs). 
 216. Colangelo, supra note 138, at 134. 
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retaliation does not occur with multilateral treaties because 
treaties are a product of negotiation and consent.217 
Retaliation also has the potential to impact American in-
terests to a much greater extent now than it has previously. 
Traditionally, American companies or individuals could safely 
ignore foreign legal actions (i.e., default) and then litigate any 
attempt to enforce the foreign judgment in the United States. 
In cases where the foreign court’s exercise of jurisdiction was 
viewed as exorbitant, the defendant would be largely judgment-
proof.218 Yet that strategy is no longer practical. In the wake of 
globalization, many American corporate defendants have sig-
nificant assets throughout the world (e.g., in the EU and Chi-
na), and corporations increasingly need to avail themselves of 
business opportunities worldwide to remain competitive in a 
global market.219 More significantly, as U.S. law has recognized 
broader legitimate exercises of jurisdiction (such as under the 
effects and universality principles), so too can others nations’ 
courts broadly exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction without it 
being found offensive. Of course, all this may be beside the 
point. Even if a judgment is ultimately unenforceable, the costs 
of litigation and the potential for enforcement (as slim as it 
may be)220 force companies and individuals to account for for-
eign regulations and laws.221 The potential impact is even 
 
 217. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 34, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 341 (noting that treaties only create obligations and rights 
through consent); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 436–37 (ex-
plaining how states are only bound to treaty obligations after providing con-
sent and how this is “[o]ne of the most established principles in international 
law”); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. 1, ch.1, in-
troductory note (1987) (“Modern international law is rooted in acceptance by 
states which constitute the system.”). 
 218. See ROBERT E. LUTZ, A LAWYERS HANDBOOK FOR ENFORCING FOR-
EIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 22–23 (2007). 
 219. See Gerber, supra note 130, at 299 (noting how in global markets 
“[p]eople are hired and fired, factories are built, loans are taken, and supplies 
are purchased in many countries in order to implement competitive strategies 
on one market”). 
 220. For interesting discussions of the enforcement of un-American judg-
ments, see Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 
172, 232 (2004) (depicting judgments as un-American if they come from “non-
American polities and reflect political values that are at variance with Ameri-
can constitutional law,” and discussing the enforcement of un-American for-
eign judgments from a constitutional perspective); Mark D. Rosen, Should 
“Un-American” Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 787 
(2004) (“[U]n-American judgments should be enforced at least some of the 
time.”). 
 221. See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as 
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greater in the public law context. The way the United States 
has waged its war on terror—viewed almost universally as 
extralegal222—means that American officials are more than ev-
er susceptible to foreign actions.223 
The possibility of retaliation, however, is not the only prob-
lem. Extraterritorial application of domestic law threatens 
democratic sovereignty224 in a more profound way than inter-
national treaties and their institutions.225 Under traditional no-
tions of democracy, government rests upon the consent of the 
governed.226 But extraterritorial laws force foreigners to bear 
 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco 
Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 05-35153); Brief for the Nat’l 
Mining Ass’n and the Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appel-
lant, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(No. 05-35153). 
 222. From Guantanamo Bay, to prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, to extraor-
dinary renditions, to alleged secret prisons, to the Iraq war, among others, the 
world community has condemned recent U.S. actions as illegal under interna-
tional law. See DEBORAH PEARLSTEIN, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, GETTING TO 
GROUND TRUTH 1–20 (2004), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/PDF/ 
detainees/Getting_to_Ground_Truth_090804.pdf. For a description of U.S. 
lawsuits filed by foreign nationals against U.S. officials for their participation 
in the U.S. war on terror, see, for example, Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The 
Alien Tort Statute and the War on Terrorism, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 105 
(2005). 
 223. See sources cited supra note 210 (reporting lawsuits against former 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. General Tommy Franks and others 
for alleged war crimes). 
 224. See Mark P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Laws: 
The Perversion of Democratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, 
and the Imperative of Establishing Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 297, 312–13 (1996) (describing the undemocratic nature of 
extraterritorial laws); Gibney & Emerick, supra note 164, at 133 (stating that 
the extraterritorial application of the law is undemocratic in that it 
“represents a vastly different conception of the law than what we have in the 
domestic realm”). 
 225. See sources cited supra note 217 (explaining how treaties derive their 
legitimacy from state consent). Some scholars suggest that multilateral insti-
tutions are more likely to enhance domestic democracy than undermine it. See, 
e.g., Robert O. Keohane et al., Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism 1 
(N.Y.U. Sch. Law Inst. for Int’l Law & Justice, Working Paper 2007/4, 2007), 
available at http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/multilateralism.pdf 
(“[P]articipation in multilateral institutions . . . can enhance the quality of 
domestic democracy.”). 
 226. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Govern-
ments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent 
of the governed . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 254 (James Madison) (Ja-
cob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (noting that the Constitution’s authority derives from 
popular consent); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 362 (Peter 
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (suggesting that government 
authority to tax can only legitimately derive from the consent of the governed). 
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the costs of domestic regulation, even though foreigners (i.e., 
those beyond the state’s territorial borders) are nearly power-
less to change those regulations.227 Foreigners are the true out-
siders to the political process with no vote, and presumably lit-
tle formal ability to influence domestic political processes.228 
The decision makers—the domestic courts—are politically un-
accountable to the foreign defendants and apply laws to which 
the foreigners have not consented.229 The threat to democratic 
sovereignty may be particularly felt when the countries in 
which laws are applied extraterritorially are themselves not 
liberal democracies. For these reasons, scholars have described 
the extraterritorial application of law as the greatest affront to 
democratic sovereignty.230 
Admittedly, the democratic legitimacy problem has histori-
cally been less of a concern for Americans. When only U.S. law 
is applied extraterritorially, only foreigners suffer the affront. 
But as described above, no longer is extraterritoriality a uni-
quely U.S. phenomenon—other nations increasingly apply their 
law extraterritorially as well.231 A comparison drives the point 
home. The practice of U.S. courts citing and using foreign law 
has led to fierce and virulent responses over concerns that the 
use of foreign law leads to undemocratic results.232 Sovereign-
 
 227. See, e.g., Parrish, supra note 167, at 407 (discussing the undemocratic 
nature of extraterritorial laws in the Canadian-U.S. context). 
 228. William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An 
Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 153 (1998) (not-
ing that “[f ]oreign interests are virtually unrepresented in national legislative 
decisions” because “[t]hey can neither vote in elections nor contribute to politi-
cal campaigns”); cf. Jeffrey K. Powell, Comment, Prohibitions on Campaign 
Contributions from Foreign Sources: Questioning Their Justification in a 
Global Interdependent Economy, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 957, 960 (1996) 
(arguing against “blanket prohibitions against all types of foreign campaign 
contribution”). 
 229. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 346 (“Even assuming that the 
defendant-alien’s country has consented to this law on the international plane, 
there is no evidence that this consent extends to domestic enforcement in the 
United States or any other country.”). 
 230. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty 
Box: Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989, 
1992–96 (2004) (acknowledging but criticizing the argument that “[t]o the ex-
tent that a state is subject to law made elsewhere, it has lost its sovereignty, 
and, perhaps, in some deep way, its right to call itself a ‘state’”); cf. Bradley, 
supra note 20, at 464–69 (arguing that human rights litigation and its reliance 
on customary international law imposes costs on U.S. democracy). 
 231. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 232. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret 
the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 58 (2004) (arguing that “[u]sing global 
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tists have written literally dozens of articles condemning the 
practice,233 and the political uproar has been shrill.234 But that 
affront to democratic sovereignty is minimal compared to the 
problems that extraterritorial laws pose—where foreign law is 
being directly applied to U.S. citizens and residents. That scho-
lars have failed to condemn the practice is thus remarkable. 
For Sovereigntists, a more important point remains. Given 
the threat of extraterritoriality, strengthening international 
law and institutions now may be the best means to maintain 
sovereignty and American hegemony and power in the long 
term.235 Unlike domestic extraterritorial actions and other ad 
hoc relations, multilateral treaty regimes “are less vulnerable 
 
opinions as a means of constitutional interpretation dramatically undermines 
sovereignty”); Laurence E. Rothenberg, International Law, U.S. Sovereignty, 
and the Death Penalty, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 547, 548 (2004) (arguing that the 
U.S. criminal justice system’s sovereignty is threatened by the “insinuation” of 
foreign law into death penalty decisions); see also Appropriate Role of Foreign 
Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H.R. 568 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong. 49 (2004) (statement of Jeremy Rabkin, Professor of Government, Cor-
nell University) (arguing that the European Union “is really set on . . . under-
mining American sovereignty” by “infiltrat[ing] into our judicial system this 
idea that our judges need to listen to what their judges say”). 
 233. See Parrish, supra note 73, at 639 n.9 (listing articles arguing against 
using international law in constitutional interpretation and adjudication). 
 234. See Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, DeLay Says Federal Judiciary 
Has ‘Run Amok,’ Adding Congress is Partly to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 
2005, at A21 (noting how Senator Tom Coburn’s chief of staff, Michael 
Schwartz, has called for “mass impeachment” of federal judges); Adam Liptak 
& Robin Toner, Roberts Parries Queries on Roe and End of Life, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 15, 2005, at A1 (describing Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.’s response 
to Senator Tom Coburn’s suggestion that “Supreme Court Justices who cite to 
foreign judicial precedents . . . should be subject to impeachment”). Represent-
ative Tom Feeney (R-Fla.) also proposed a bill, known as the Feeney Amend-
ment, that would “expose judges to impeachment for referring to foreign law in 
their opinions.” Foreign Law Bill Irks Ginsburg, CONN. L. TRIB., Oct. 3, 2005, 
at 11 (discussing Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s remarks regarding proposed 
impeachment bill). The Justices have even received death threats for consider-
ing foreign authority in their decisions. Ginsburg, O’Connor Targets of Death 
Threat, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 20, 2006, at 3, 3; Tony Mauro, Ginsburg Discloses 
Threats on Her Life: In Speeches, Justice Says She and Sandra Day O’Connor 
Were Targeted Because of Use of Foreign Law in Cases, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 20, 
2006, at 8, 8. 
 235. See Krisch, supra note 107, at 375 (“U.S. activism in multilateral in-
stitution-building after World War II has arguably been due, in part, to a 
sense that U.S. predominance was ephemeral and would give way to a bipolar 
system.”); cf. RICHARD A. MELANSON, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE 
VIETNAM WAR 101–02 (M.E. Sharpe 1996) (1991) (mentioning the Carter ad-
ministration’s “inclination to view human rights as a means to . . . sustain 
U.S. international influence at a time of relatively declining American power”). 
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to later shifts in power” and are “relatively stable even if the 
hegemon declines.”236 International treaty law thus shapes the 
behavior of states.237 And not being part of a treaty regime un-
dermines a nation’s ability to influence the development of the 
law.238 If the insight from realists and modern rationalist scho-
lars is that international law is all about power, then the Unit-
ed States would be wise to use that power to influence interna-
tional law while it still can.239 With indications that China and 
the EU may begin to challenge U.S. hegemony, embracing in-
ternational law now—while the United States is still in a posi-
tion to shape norms—may be strategically wise.240 That is, 
“[f]or those interested in promoting democratic sovereignty, it 
is a far, far better thing for the United States to be the chief 
progenitor of international law than, say, the People’s Republic 
of China.”241 
In contrast, American influence over the world is much 
more circumscribed when domestic law replaces international 
law. Conducting foreign policy through courts is difficult—this 
 
 236. Krisch, supra note 107, at 373. 
 237. Hathaway, supra note 25, at 473 (arguing and demonstrating how “in-
ternational treaty law profoundly shapes state behavior”); see Pierre Klein, 
The Effects of US Predominance on the Elaboration of Treaty Regimes and on 
the Evolution of the Law of Treaties, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 363, 363–64 (Michael Byers & Georg 
Nolte eds., 2003) (explaining how the “influence exerted by a particularly po-
werful State on the treaty-making process may therefore have an important 
impact on the shaping of international law in the years and decades to come”). 
 238. The Clinton Administration’s approach to the Rome Statute, and its 
decision to sign the treaty despite strong U.S. opposition to the International 
Criminal Court illustrates the point. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 
387, 399 (2001) (“With signature . . . [the United States] will be in a position to 
influence the evolution of the court.” (quoting Statement on the Rome Treaty 
on the International Criminal Court, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 4 (Dec. 31, 
2000))); see also Klein, supra note 236, at 363–91 (describing U.S. influence on 
treaty regimes). 
 239. See Klein, supra note 237, at 363 (“History shows that it is very gen-
erally much more efficient in the long run for States to ‘apply power within the 
framework of an institution or legal system’ rather than to resort to raw mili-
tary force or economic coercion.” (quoting MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER 
AND THE POWER OF RULES 6 (1999))). 
 240. Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843, 
843 (2001) (explaining that “America is in a position to reshape norms, alter 
expectations and create new realities” through “unapologetic and implacable 
demonstrations of will”); see Klein, supra note 237, at 365–71 (explaining how 
the U.S. can exert influence on the formation of international law through 
treaty-making). 
 241. Drezner, supra note 4, at 333. 
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would be true even if extraterritorial lawsuits were limited to 
U.S. courts. In the United States, exploitative litigation can be 
filed “because of weak constraints on the kinds of suits that get 
filed and the potential for perverse incentives to litigants.”242 
But these concerns are magnified when dealing with foreign le-
gal systems. Is the U.S. government to keep track of all law-
suits filed abroad that can potentially affect American inter-
ests? Even then, national governments have less opportunity 
and ability to interact and directly influence other countries’ 
courts. And to the extent that influence exists, national gov-
ernments find it much easier to deal with foreign affairs issues 
at government-to-government levels. At minimum, Sovereign-
tists should be concerned with domestic courts wielding greater 
influence in developing international law. Whether private liti-
gation—even in a U.S. court—is the best way to resolve compli-
cated transboundary issues is far from clear.243 At the very 
least, foreign courts will be open to the accusation of parochial 
biases—with the appearance, if not the reality, that those 
courts favor foreign over U.S. interests.244 
 
 242. Stephan, supra note 131, at 660. 
 243. Hall, supra note 186, at 449 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
“admitted that it is not the ideal forum for addressing transboundary pollution 
disputes, which tend to involve complex technical and scientific issues with 
major political and economic ratifications”); see also Richard B. Bilder, The 
Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 821, 829–31 
(1989) (noting the problems with domestic courts deciding issues involving for-
eign affairs); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federal-
ism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1668 (1997) (arguing that courts are poorly equipped 
to address questions involving foreign relations); John Yoo, Federal Courts as 
Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the Helms-Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 747, 764 (1997) (“Courts are imperfect tools for gather-
ing information, especially when the relevant issues for decision involve 
broader political, economic, and social events and trends.”). 
 244. In a related vein, much has been written concerning parochial bias in 
U.S. courts. See, e.g., Born, supra note 133, at 95–99 (arguing that parochial 
bias is not a problem in U.S. courts); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisen-
berg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1120–22, 1143 
(1996) (exploring reasons why foreigners fear U.S. courts but concluding, 
based on empirical data, that foreign litigants “do very well” in U.S. courts); 
Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and 
Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes Involving Nonci-
tizens, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 35–36 (1996) (describing bias against foreign citi-
zens in U.S. courts). Christopher A. Whytock, Myth or Mess? International 
Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1257096 (arguing, based 
on empirical data, that transnational choice-of-law decisions in U.S. courts are 
not biased in favor of domestic law, domestic litigants, or plaintiffs). 
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A natural response exists to all this. Some international 
law skeptics presumably would prefer a world where domestic 
extraterritorial laws are curtailed, and international law is also 
rejected. In such a world, states would rely solely on politics 
and power to extend influence. Yet such an approach would be 
near impossible to implement. In a globalized, modern, inter-
dependent world, “it is impossible to conceive of a return to na-
ture, to a pre-regulatory planet in which each state is free to 
act as it wishes, unfettered by international obligations.”245 
Even if the forces of globalization were not an issue, NGOs, ac-
tivist groups, and other states would not sit by idly. A remedy 
must exist somewhere for international harms. And if an entity 
has engaged in a blatant violation of an international norm, 
why should the entity not be held accountable? The question 
then is not whether law will address international challenges, 
but rather whether it will be international or extraterritorial in 
nature. 
B. TAKING MODERN INTERNATIONALIST CONCERNS SERIOUSLY 
The modern Internationalists should also be wary of courts 
extraterritorially applying domestic laws as a way to address 
international challenges. As a means of promoting human and 
environmental rights, the extraterritorial application of domes-
tic law is likely to be successful, if at all, only in the short term. 
From a Sovereigntist perspective, one of the threats of non-U.S. 
transnational litigation is the inability of the U.S. federal gov-
ernment to easily respond. From a modern Internationalist 
perspective, the problem is that foreign governments may be all 
too good at responding. Indeed, foreign states have long re-
sisted U.S. civil litigation as a way of projecting American poli-
cy.246 From diplomatic protests247 to nonrecognition of judg-
ments,248 to enactment of blocking249 or clawback statutes,250 
 
 245. SANDS, supra note 97, at xviii. 
 246. Stephan, supra note 131, at 655. 
 247. For example, the European Community and the United Kingdom 
submitted protests when the United States amended its Export Administra-
tion Regulations to prohibit the export of oil or natural gas exploitation 
equipment to the Soviet Union. A. V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: 
AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIALS 197, 201 (1983) (“The 
United States measures as they apply in the present case are unacceptable 
under international law because of their extra-territorial aspects. They seek to 
regulate companies not of United States nationality in respect of their conduct 
outside the United States and particularly the handling of property and tech-
nical data of these companies not within the United States.”). 
 248. See generally LUTZ, supra note 218 (criticizing the United States for 
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countries have a wide range of options to prevent the effective 
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. And, even worse, some 
commentators believe the effect could spur a backlash and goad 
foreign governments away from those values we hold most im-
portant.251 
Yet ineffectiveness of enforcement is not the only problem 
that should concern modern Internationalists. Extraterritorial 
laws undermine international law in a more fundamental way. 
Persistent resort to domestic courts, rather than developing 
multilateral treaty regimes, creates a self-perpetuating cycle 
 
not recognizing international civil judgments and prescribing a method for li-
tigating the enforcement of foreign judgments at home and abroad). For a dis-
cussion of extraterritoriality and its connection to judgment enforcement, see 
Berman, supra note 155, at 945 (“[I]t is clear that judgment recognition is in-
creasingly the place where deterritorialized jurisdictional assertions meet the 
reality of territorial enforcement.”). 
 249. See Harry L. Clark, Dealing with U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions and 
Foreign Countermeasures, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 61, 81–87 (1991) (de-
scribing blocking statutes in the E.U., Canada, and Mexico); William S. Dodge, 
Antitrust and the Draft Hague Judgments Convention, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L 
BUS. 363, 363 n.1 (2001) (noting that the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Norway, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Canada, and South 
Africa have all enacted blocking legislation to U.S. antitrust laws); cf. John W. 
Boscariol, An Anatomy of a Cuban Pyjama Crisis: Reconsidering Blocking Leg-
islation in Response to Extraterritorial Trade Measures in the United States, 
30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 439, 441–42 (1999) (describing the Canadian law 
that, inter alia, subjects individuals and corporations to criminal investigation 
or prosecution for complying with extraterritorial measures); Note, Insider 
Trading and the Internationalization of the Securities Markets, 27 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 409, 423 (1989) (explaining that French blocking laws “forbid[ ] 
nationals, and certain others with ties to France, from divulging economic, 
commercial, industrial, financial or technical matters to foreign authorities 
except as provided by international agreement”). 
 250. A clawback statute “enables certain defendants who have paid a mul-
tiple damage judgment in an overseas country to recover the multiple portion 
of that judgment from the successful plaintiff.” Note, Power to Reverse Foreign 
Judgments: The British Clawback Statute Under International Law, 81 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 1097, 1097–98 (1981); see Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 
R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1985) (examples of blocking and clawback statutes in the Ca-
nadian context); see also Andrew C. Dekany, Canada’s Foreign Extraterritorial 
Measures Act: Using Canadian Criminal Sanctions to Block U.S. Anti-Cuban 
Legislation, 28 CAN. BUS. L.J. 210, 211 (1997); William C. Graham, The For-
eign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 11 CAN. BUS. L.J. 410, 410–12 (1986); cf. 
Mitsuo Matsushita & Aya Lino, The Blocking Legislation as a Countermeasure 
to the U.S. Anti-Dumping Act of 1916: A Comparative Analysis of the EC and 
Japanese Damage Recovery Legislation, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 753 (2006). 
 251. See Stephan, supra note 131, at 658 (“The more general point is that 
U.S. lawsuits motivated by expressive concerns run the risk of goading foreign 
governments away from moderation and reconciliation and toward intransi-
gence.”). 
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that ultimately undermines progressive development of inter-
national treaty law and international institutions.252 A singular 
focus on developing and enforcing norms in domestic courts de-
tracts from attention and efforts to develop international laws 
and shared norms.253 At least comprehensive solutions are 
nearly impossible through domestic litigation. Extraterritoriali-
ty inevitably leads to a patchwork of inconsistent adjudications 
as different courts from different countries approach interna-
tional issues using different laws and procedures.254 In compar-
ison, international tribunals enjoy procedural and other advan-
tages that make them more suited to resolving international 
claims.255 
Modern Internationalists should also be wary (or perhaps 
embarrassed) of the apparent imperialism of using U.S. laws to 
serve global goals. Scholars have already challenged substan-
tive human rights law as imposing Western values on other 
cultures.256 The extraterritorial application of American law 
 
 252. See Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and International Protec-
tion of Religious Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT’L L. 33, 73 (2002). 
 253. Cf. Dubinsky, supra note 140, at 303 (“To date the human rights 
community has offered little outward reflection on whether an aggressive 
agenda focused on domestic courts may harm the very institutions to which 
these advocates have turned.”). 
 254. See, e.g., Paul L. Langer, Significant Current Developments in Envi-
ronmental Insurance Coverage, 690 PLI/Comm. 129, 129 (1994) (describing a 
“litigation explosion” over the insurance coverage aspects of environmental 
liability that has led to a “patchwork of inconsistent and often conflicting deci-
sions”); cf. Abate, supra note 190, at 131–33 (noting that climate change litiga-
tion is a patchwork, rather than comprehensive, solution that invites retalia-
tion and discord between bordering nations); Erik B. Bluemel, Unraveling the 
Global Warming Regime Complex: Competitive Entropy in the Regulation of 
the Global Public Good, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1981, 2043–45 (2007) (promoting 
the efficiency of harmonization and the benefits of a single trading regime over 
a multiple regime complex); Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and 
the Madisonian Democracy, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 471–78 (2000) (calling 
for national standardization of mass-tort litigation to prevent states from 
enacting laws that favor their citizen-plaintiffs over those in other states). 
 255. Dubinsky, supra note 140, at 308–09 (finding that supranational tri-
bunals, like the five geographically specific atrocity courts created by the U.N., 
are procedurally advantaged over domestic courts because they were “written 
with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in mind,” and can 
offer regional expertise as well as continuity). 
 256. See, e.g., M.O. Chibundu, Making Customary International Law 
Through Municipal Adjudication, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1069, 1137 (1999); see also 
SASSEN, supra note 57, at 18 (describing the formation of transnational re-
gimes “centered in Western economic concepts”); Buxbaum, supra note 140, at 
302–03. 
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certainly has the appearance of a unilateral instrument of 
American hegemony.257 Other countries often view American 
court decisions as suspect.258 This is particularly true when the 
United States applies a double standard—permitting foreigners 
to be sued in U.S. courts, but not permitting human rights law-
suits to be filed against American actors.259 Accordingly, vigor-
ous enforcement of human rights through international in-
struments and institutions often has a greater claim to 
legitimacy than domestic enforcement. 
That other nations increasingly enforce their domestic law 
extraterritorially to extend their own international influence is 
problematic in another way. Little reason exists to believe that 
foreign laws necessarily will be consistent with Western con-
cepts of justice. As Alfred Rubin argued almost twenty years 
ago, when transnational human rights litigation was in its nas-
cent stages, “[p]lacing ourselves in the position of world police-
 
 257. Buxbaum, supra note 140, at 304 (discussing the concern that trans-
national litigation will be used to serve U.S. regulatory ends); see also Krisch, 
supra note 107, at 402–03 (2005) (tracking the maintenance of American he-
gemony through the use of conditions for aid and market access, human rights 
certification mechanisms, and unilateral sanctions); cf. Rubin, supra note 23, 
at 374 (noting that the perceived illegitimacy of American prescriptive, adjudi-
cative and enforcement jurisdiction provides a common enemy—the United 
States—for governments who ignore their own international obligations). See 
generally Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American Law in Europe, 39 
AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1991) (surveying the increasing influence of American 
legal concepts in European business and corporate law, constitutional law, and 
tort law). 
 258. See, e.g., Dubinsky, supra note 140, at 309 n.510 (reporting on a Mis-
sissippi case in which a local plaintiff sued a Canadian corporation and won an 
excessive punitive judgment after a trial fraught with bias and racism). 
 259. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Comments on Chapters 4 and 5, in UNITED 
STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 84, at 183 (“Clearly wishing to exercise leadership of the planet, now or-
ganized on the basis of the standards of ‘good governance’ drawn from its ex-
perience of democracy alone, which is regarded as in principle superior to that 
of others, the United States claims simultaneously to subject other States to 
respect international law while freeing itself as far as at all possible from the 
constraints that same law imposes on it.”); see also Bradley, supra note 20, at 
469 (“The U.S. government often assesses other nations’ compliance with in-
ternational human rights standards, but it generally has been unwilling to 
apply international human rights law inward against domestic governmental 
actors.”); cf. Krisch, supra note 107, at 391 (discussing resistance by the Unit-
ed States to international human rights mechanisms that criticize or run 
counter to its own domestic policies). But see Jack Goldsmith, International 
Human Rights Law and the United States Double Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 
365, 366 (1998) (exploring, and ultimately defending, the double standard of 
the United States’ refusal to “embrace the international human rights stan-
dards that it urges on other[ ]” nations). 
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man for our version of international law creates a defensive 
reaction in even our allies . . . . It creates a precedent and sense 
of righteousness in others who would apply their laws and their 
versions of international law to Americans whose actions they 
do not like.”260 In recent years, even “U.S. courts have tended to 
adopt very narrow interpretations of rights protected under in-
ternational human rights and humanitarian law treaties.”261 
Internationalists rightly fear how U.S. courts will construe en-
vironmental rights.262 This fear should be much greater with 
foreign courts that are less likely to share U.S. visions of liber-
al, democratic values.263 At the very least, lawsuits may be filed 
by opportunistic litigants.264 Or litigants may begin to forum 
shop to preemptively prevent suits seeking to impose liabili-
 
 260. Rubin, supra note 23, at 374. 
 261. Sloss, supra note 25, at 48; see, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 
33, 40–42 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (declining to enforce Common Article 3 of the Gene-
va Conventions in federal court, because the war against terrorism is not an 
“armed conflict not of an international character”), rev’d, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); 
United States v. Duarte-Acero, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1041 (S.D. Fla. 2001) 
(holding that defendant was not entitled to protection under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) because Ecuador first arrested 
him before turning him over to the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, 
so any claim of ICCPR violations would have to be brought in Ecuador); see 
also Bradley, supra note 20, at 466 (arguing that U.S. federal judges have 
used judicially created doctrines to limit, not advance, human rights litiga-
tion). 
 262. Far from certain is whether courts will be friendly to environmental 
rights. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Re-
straint in the Supreme Court’s Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. 
REV. 343, 346 (1989) (describing recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions more 
pro-development than pro-environmental); cf. Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring 
What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 
UCLA L. REV. 703, 703 (2000) (analyzing the votes of individual Justices of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in support of the argument that the Court views envi-
ronmental protection “as merely an incidental factual context” for a given case, 
rather than recognizing environmental law as a discrete area of law). See gen-
erally Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protection Law in 
the Supreme Court, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999) (demonstrating that a 
significant number of U.S. Supreme Court decisions have had anti-
environmental results). 
 263. This is particularly true with the “global rise in religious fundamen-
talism and an increased focus on the plight of women living under oppressive, 
patriarchal regimes.” Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 
95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 806 (2007). After all, law is embedded in the culture and 
history of a nation and its peoples. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOC-
RACY IN AMERICA 42 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 2007) (1835) (explaining that social 
condition is the source of laws). 
 264. Stephan, supra note 131, at 651–52 (illustrating problems of exploitive 
and opportunistic civil litigation). 
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ty.265 Internationalists might then do well to oppose in principle 
all kinds of transnational extraterritorial litigation on the 
grounds that domestic courts may set dangerous precedents 
weakening international legal protection. 
This concern can be viewed from a slightly different pers-
pective. In the international sphere, the United States was suc-
cessful in imposing its perspective on international law after 
the Second World War, and the result has been the rise of hu-
man rights regimes. But if law migration really can occur,266 
would the modern Internationalists be comfortable if the inter-
national norms being created are not only non-American, but 
un-American, illiberal, and perhaps counter to traditional con-
cepts of individual rights?267 There’s little reason to believe that 
other states (those unfriendly to human and environmental 
rights) will not equally be able to influence and effect change in 
international law.268 Said differently, the disaggregation of the 
nation-state may lead to a pluralism that we are uncomfortable 
with. 
C. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
So how should Sovereigntists and modern Internationalists 
respond to the threat of extraterritoriality? A complete descrip-
tion of how to reclaim international law is beyond the scope of 
this article. But some modest observations are appropriate. 
Good reasons exist to embrace traditional international 
law. State-centered international law, tempered by strong hu-
man rights enforcement, is designed to prevent jealousies be-
tween states and excessive nationalism. Indeed, the widely held 
view of international law, until recently, was one of a system 
that would “triumph over narrow nationalism and, in so 
doing, . . . promote the peaceful settlement of disputes and a 
 
 265. Bradley, supra note 20, at 471 (describing the problem of forum shop-
ping in human rights litigation, particularly via the Alien Torture Statute). 
 266. See Spiro, Globalization, supra note 1, at 728 (arguing that “a global 
order . . . [of ] communities of transnational definition” has restructured how 
nation-states exercise their powers); cf. id. at 730 (“[N]o country—not even the 
supposed sole superpower—can resist or insulate itself from global forces.”). 
 267. For an interesting discussion of the problems of tolerating illiberal 
groups in the context of American Indian tribal sovereignty, see generally Ri-
ley, supra note 263. 
 268. See Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Dollarizing State and Professional 
Expertise: Transnational Processes and Questions of Legitimation in State 
Transformation, 1960–2000, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES: GLOBALI-
SATION AND POWER DISPARITIES 199 (M. Likosky ed., 2002) (describing the 
importing and exporting of ideas and norms). 
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common, cooperative approach to the resolution of global is-
sues.”269 And it has worked reasonably well. Under classic in-
ternational law doctrine, respect for territorial integrity 
through nonintervention in other states’ domestic affairs pro-
moted peace and stability.270 This is the core of the concept of 
sovereign equality and the ban on nonintervention.271 But 
extraterritorial application of law threatens to compromise that 
very principle,272 and with it the stability the world has seen 
over the past fifty years. 
The United States should encourage the development of in-
ternational norms and procedures, because by doing so it pro-
tects its position in the world, and it avoids the difficulties with 
extraterritoriality. States enter into multilateral agreements 
specifically to obtain political, military, and economic security. 
Once created, multilateral laws and their institutions are less 
vulnerable to later shifts in power—thus protecting the inter-
ests of hegemons, like the United States, and projecting their 
influence even after hegemony has ended.273 Nico Krisch has 
described it well, explaining how international law can lead to 
stability and the embedding of the values of dominant states: 
[I]nternational law is also extremely useful as an instrument of stabi-
lization: it allows dominant states to project their visions of world or-
der into the future, since once they are transformed into law, the 
backward-looking character of international law makes them refer-
ence points for future policies. And oftentimes, concepts strongly 
rooted in international legal norms create a new normality: over time, 
they modify the conceptions of legitimacy of international society, 
which makes later changes all the more difficult.274 
 
 269. Franck, supra note 83, at 89. 
 270. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
 271. Dupuy, supra note 259, at 180. 
 272. See id. at 181 (explaining that extraterritorial application of law is 
“incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality, since sovereignty is 
characterized specifically by the exclusivity of a sovereign State’s normative 
powers in its own territory”). 
 273. Krisch, supra note 107, at 373 (“[M]ultilateral norms and institutions 
are less vulnerable to later shifts in power than ad hoc political relations; they 
will thus be relatively stable even if the hegemon declines, and will for some 
time preserve an order that reflects the hegemon’s preferences (stabiliza-
tion).”); cf. Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agree-
ments, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 511–22 (2004) (arguing that international 
agreements are a more stable method of entrenching domestic policy than sta-
tutory law). See generally G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, 
STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 
(2001) (describing how international governance can serve the interests of he-
gemonic powers). 
 274. Krisch, supra note 107, at 377. 
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Some evidence also exists that, unlike extraterritorial laws, in-
ternational lawmaking is democracy-enhancing,275 and particu-
larly useful to aid other states transition to democratic gov-
ernment.276 
A common response is to agree with these benefits, but to 
suggest that extraterritorial national laws are a necessary im-
petus to obtain international agreement.277 The idea is enticing 
and appears logical: conflict between states will spur negotia-
tions and provide incentives to cooperate multilaterally.278 But 
ultimately, the idea flounders and does not lead to the coopera-
tion expected. First, little empirical support exists to suggest 
that extraterritorial laws lead to greater cooperation.279 The 
United States, for example, began applying its antitrust laws 
extraterritorially in the 1940s.280 Yet not until 1999 did the 
United States enter its first bilateral antitrust agreement.281 
And despite fierce foreign opposition to extraterritorial U.S. an-
titrust laws and the ensuing friction—which, in theory, should 
have spurred international lawmaking—cooperation in the 
form of a multilateral competition treaty seems still far out of 
reach.282 Second, historically it has been the United States—
 
 275. Robert O. Keohane et al., Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism 1 
(Inst. Int’l Law & Justice Working Paper No. 2007/4, 2007), available at http:// 
www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2007-4.GAL.KMM.web.pdf (“[M]ultilater-
alism often enhances domestic democracy in the contemporary world. It can 
restrict the efficacy of special interest factions, protect individual rights, and 
improve the quality of democratic deliberation.”). 
 276. Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, 
and International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 707, 712 (2006) (“Interna-
tional law . . . is a particularly useful device for certain kinds of states, namely 
those that are undergoing a transition to democracy.”). 
 277. See Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust 
and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a “Choice-of-Law” Ap-
proach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1817 (1992) (arguing for a presumption that U.S. 
laws apply in antitrust and securities litigation “whenever there are effects in 
the United States that are . . . direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” 
internal citation omitted)). 
 278. Dodge, supra note 228, at 166–67 (suggesting that extraterritorial 
laws can spur greater cooperation by providing stronger incentives to nego-
tiate). 
 279. Conventional wisdom has always suggested the opposite is true. See 
supra notes 212–15 and accompanying text (describing the conflicts, tensions, 
and problems created unnecessarily by extraterritorial laws). 
 280. Eleanor Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 911, 912–13 (2003). 
 281. Id. at 921 n.27. 
 282. See Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501, 1504 (1998) (“[T]he incentives facing individual countries 
make it extremely difficult—perhaps impossible—to negotiate substantive in-
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not other countries—that has needed encouragement to enter 
into multilateral treaties, even those that serve long term 
American interests.283 Extraterritorial American laws have not 
only taken the pressure off the United States to join multila-
teral agreements, but have provided it an incentive to derail 
them.284 More importantly, those who argue for extraterritorial 
laws as a means of advancing international cooperation again 
assume that the extraterritorial laws will be only American 
laws (i.e. that the pressure will only be placed on other coun-
tries). But in an age of global extraterritoriality, it is far from 
clear why the United States should welcome pressure, through 
extraterritorial laws, compelling it to negotiate international 
agreements from a position of weakness rather than power.285 
Using extraterritorial laws then as a way to achieve interna-
tional agreement seems a particularly misguided strategy. 
To be sure, there may be short-term costs of turning to in-
ternational treaties and multilateral agreements as a way to 
solve transboundary challenges. In reclaiming international 
law—embracing multilateralism—the United States would 
 
ternational antitrust agreements.”). See generally Anu Bradford, International 
Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the W.T.O., 48 HARV. J. INT’L L. 
383 (2007) (exploring why binding international agreement on antitrust issues 
has been difficult to reach); Riyaz Dattu, A Journey from Havana to Paris: The 
Fifty-Year Quest for the Elusive Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 24 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 275 (2000) (examining the failure of the Havana Charter 
and multilateral agreements on investment, despite fifty years of attempts). 
Efforts to create a multilateral treaty on recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments have also collapsed. See Foreign Judgments Recognition and Enforce-
ment Act (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2004), available at http://www.ali.org; see al-
so Council to the Members of the American Law Institute, International 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Project (NKA Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute), 82 A.L.I. Proc. 
74-312 (2004) (unpublished), available at http://www.ali.org. 
 283. See infra Part II.A. In the antitrust context, the U.S. has been the 
primary stumbling block to multilateral agreement. See Sharon E. Foster, 
While America Slept: The Harmonization of Competition Laws Based upon the 
European Union Model, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 467, 498 (2001). 
 284. Foster, supra note 283, at 498. 
 285. Some evidence suggests European countries are using extraterritorial 
laws as a way to “compel the United States to come to the table and negotiate 
global standards for antitrust enforcement.” Antonio F. Perez, International 
Antitrust at the Crossroads: The End of Antitrust History or the Clash of Com-
petition Policy Civilizations?, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 527, 527 (2002). See 
generally Sarah Stevens, The Increased Aggression of the E.C. Commission in 
Extraterritorial Enforcement of the Merger Regulation and Its Impact on 
Transatlantic Cooperation in Antitrust, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 263 
(2002) (describing pressure placed on the United States and American compa-
nies through extraterritorial regulation). 
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need to give up its claims to American exceptionalism. As a na-
tion, we would have to be content to find that at times our in-
ternational obligations would run counter to immediate Ameri-
can interest. But we could also be comforted by the knowledge 
that overall, in the longer term, our interests would be pro-
tected to a greater extent. Indeed, in the past, “as long as [the 
United States has] limited itself to the promotion of its own in-
terests (which is the essence of international negotiations), the 
United States has experienced an appreciable success in shap-
ing international law through treaties.”286 Only when it “pre-
tends to be entitled to some kind of exceptional treatment” has 
the United States met with opposition and become isolated.287 
Before concluding, two things that this article does not ad-
vocate are worth emphasizing. First, the United States has the 
right—indeed, the duty—to refuse to sign and ratify an inter-
national treaty with which it disagrees. But the refusal should 
come from disagreement with the details of the treaty itself, not 
from a generalized philosophical objection to international law 
solely because it is international. Nor should the objection to 
treaties come from a perceived moral imperative to vindicate 
U.S. democratic sovereignty, given the democratic problems 
that the extraterritorial alternative implicates. Neither should 
international treaties be set aside merely because they lack the 
expediency of domestic actions. Difficult compromises and hard 
work are to be expected and are beneficial to ensure good law. 
It is much better for the United States to take these steps now, 
while it remains in a position of global power, than to wait until 
its power ends, and the ability to negotiate beneficial, albeit 
self-serving, treaties is circumscribed. 
Second, this article does not criticize those activists who 
bring extraterritorial claims. They are acting as lawyers for 
their clients. They have not been hired to worry over the long-
term policy implications of extraterritorial lawsuits. But aca-
demics and policymakers have no such excuse. They should be 
much more sensitive to the long-term implications of turning 
toward extraterritorial domestic law. For the activists, in the 
current atmosphere where international law is particularly 
weak, litigation may make sense. Certainly, litigation may pro-
vide interim relief until more comprehensive solutions are 
found.288 And private party litigation can serve the important 
 
 286. Klein, supra note 237, at 375. 
 287. Id. at 375–76. 
 288. See, e.g., David R. Wooley, Acid Rain: Canadian Litigation Options in 
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function of focusing attention upon the problem. In fact, the 
public attention generated may be the only real benefit of these 
kind of transnational extraterritorial suits.289 But in the long 
run, extraterritoriality is not a sustainable way to solve global 
challenges. 
  CONCLUSION   
In recent years, the United States has withdrawn from in-
ternational law and multilateral institutions. Concomitant with 
the withdrawal has been a dramatic expansion of the use of 
extraterritorial laws—both in the public and private law con-
texts. Other countries are now following suit. The result is that 
domestic law, applied extraterritorially, is beginning to replace 
international law. In some ways, international law theorists 
have encouraged these changes, by either exalting the benefits 
of transnational litigation (as a short-term means of enforcing 
international norms) or by condemning everything internation-
al because of concerns over democratic legitimacy. 
The result is unfortunate. Scholars have miscalculated the 
problems that extraterritorial laws create; extraterritorial do-
mestic laws are a greater threat to what international theorists 
value most. Understanding international law as a system go-
verned by consent-based rules (not unilateral imposition), leads 
to political legitimacy and meaningful enforcement. Global go-
vernance based on extraterritorial domestic laws is an unsus-
tainable and unstable system. And international laws—
respected and embraced—may be the best way to check the 
problems that rampant extraterritoriality creates. In the longer 
view, international law is better suited to address international 
challenges, as well as to promote respect for international hu-
man rights. International law scholars would therefore be wise 
to reclaim international law. 
 
U.S. Court and Agency Proceedings, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 139, 139 (1985) (de-
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comprehensive solutions are being explored). 
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